

Africa and The Global System Disaster

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Abstract: The study proposes a critical review of the national modernization project on which every African country embarked as from 1960. Beyond the number of variants of this project based on the social content of the national liberation movement and the development strategy options implemented, the author reviews what he considers to be their common denominator, applicable to the entire third world for the whole post-war (1945-90) period which he calls the Bandung period. He describes it as a bourgeois project, although there is no real national bourgeoisie: an attempt to build "capitalism without capitalists". He then proposes a list of its achievements, on the basis of his own criteria, that of national construction and those of the populism of some experiences. He also proposes a classification based on the supreme criterion of the logic of capitalist globalization, that of the capacity of new industries to be competitive on world markets and explains Africa's failure from this standpoint by the delay caused by colonization in solving the agricultural problem. In the light of these considerations, he reviews the nature of the challenges raised today by globalization and outlines the main features of the transformations required in the design of national and regional policies and in the organization of the world system which could sustain a new departure for Africa.

Résumé : L'étude propose une lecture critique du projet national de modernisation dans lequel l'ensemble des pays africains se sont engagés à partir de 1960. L'auteur examine, par delà la variété des variantes de ce projet tenant au contenu social du mouvement de libération nationale et aux options de stratégie de développement mises en oeuvre, ce qui lui apparaît constituer leur dénominateur commun, caractéristique de toute la période de l'après guerre (1945-90) pour l'ensemble du tiers monde. Il qualifie cette période de Bandung. Il catalogue ce projet de bourgeois, en dépit de l'absence d'une véritable bourgeoisie nationale, et l'analyse comme une tentative de construction "d'un capitalisme sans capitaliste". Il propose ensuite un bilan de ses réalisations, sur la base de ses propres critères, celui de la construction nationale et ceux du populisme de certaines expériences. Il propose également un classement fondé sur le critère suprême de la logique de la mondialisation capitaliste, celui de la capacité des industries nouvelles de faire face à la compétition sur le marché mondial et explique l'échec africain de ce point de vue par le retard que la

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colonisation a apportée à la révolution agricole. A à lumière de ces considérations il examine la nature des défis que la mondialisation constitue aujourd'hui et brosse les grands traits des transformations que s'imposent dans la conception des politiques nationales et régionales et dans l'organisation du système mondial, susceptibles de soutenir un nouveau départ de l'Afrique.

Part I: The Political Economy of Africa's Economic Disaster

Introduction

At the end of four decades of post-war development, the review of the results is so strongly varied that one is tempted to reject the common expression of "third world" to represent all the countries which have been the subject of development policies over these decades. Today, we justifiably contrast a newly-industrialized competitive third world to a marginalized fourth world to which Africa, in its entirety, belongs. It is remarked, not without arguments, that the first group of these countries, especially in East Asia, have not been hit by the general crisis of contemporary capitalism and that they record high growth rates whereas the second group, i.e., Africa has been hit by the crisis, and that it seems incapable of meeting the challenges with which it is confronted.

The Third World Nationalist Modernization Project 1945-1990

The objective of development policies followed in Asia, Africa and Latin America during all the post-war period, from 1948-1950 (or from 1960 for sub-Saharan Africa) date back to the accession to independence of most states of these regions; that these states are, in the main, identical despite the differences of ideological discourse which accompanied them during this period. It involved every nationalist project which assigned itself the goal of speeding up the modernization and enrichment of society through industrialization. This denominator is easily understood if we simply recall that in 1945, practically all Asian countries (excluding Japan) Africa (including South Africa) and (with a few nuances) Latin America, were still bereft of every industry worth the name - except mining here and there. These countries were largely rural by the composition of their population, were governed by archaic regimes - such as the land-owning oligarchies of Latin America, or the monarchies under the protectorate of the Moslem Orient, China etc... or colonial Africa, India, South East Asia. Beyond their great diversity however, all the national liberation movements of these regions had the same objective - namely political independence, modernization of the State, and industrialization of the economy.

It would be incorrect to say that they did not try to achieve these objectives, as soon as they were in power. Indeed, variants of these efforts were almost as

many as the countries themselves; and it is legitimate, on this account, to classify them into the various categories which are generally used to group them together. But then one may become a victim of the criteria one would choose to classify the countries eg. such as those based on ideological preferences etc.

It is our view however, that on the contrary, it would be more useful to emphasize the common denominator which brings these different countries together; indeed I suggest that we should re-examine the historical development and its consequence i.e., the present. Industrializing involved foremost building a domestic market and protecting it from the ravages of the competition which would have prevented its formation. The starting point of carrying out an industrialization process was the practical reality facing these countries; poor countries had agricultural raw materials (cotton, food products, timber, etc.) or minerals and other natural resources already known and tapped. Such raw materials would thus enhance energy production, building materials, steel, basic chemical products etc. Since an internal market already existed and which was fed by the imports of manufactured consumer products (textiles, furniture, utensils and appliances, etc...), there was thus no reason for not taking advantage of these potentials to repeat what the West had done in their time! an industrial revolution. The formulae could vary depending on the circumstances of a given country: the size of the domestic market, available resources, or even (depending on the country's theoretical, or ideological position) giving priority to the production of equipment for industries, in order to make it possible to speed up industrialization! The final goal was the same.

This common sense approach, which was expressed in the common language of all technocrats of the epoch, gave rise to analogical, pragmatic choices to a large extent. The technology needed for industrialization could only be imported, but it was not necessary to accept the ownership of the facilities to be built by foreign capital. This depended on the power of negotiation that one had. Financial capital had to be attracted, to be invested in the country, or be borrowed. Here again, the formula, private foreign ownership, public financing obtained through domestic savings, external aid by way of grants and credits, could be adjusted to the requirements of the resources and costs.

The import requirements which these plans of accelerated growth through industrialization totally implied, could only be covered - initially - by known traditional exports, whether it was agricultural or mining products. No known development strategy was directed towards exports, i.e. guided principally by objectives of making headway in the world market by the declaration of supposed comparative advantage. The ideas which the World Bank proposes today, linking the success of some countries to an "export-oriented" policy and the failure of others to their reliance on the domestic market, is an ex-post reading of the past. Such ideas were not held at the time, either by the governments of the countries which were partly responsible for the policies in question, or by

the World Bank itself (or any other more cunning analyst of these policies). The ideal, in all cases, was the domestic market; exports were a necessary means of financing imports. Experience showed elsewhere that this reasoning was efficient. In a phase of general growth as that of the post-war period, the demand for almost all possible products was itself in continuous growth, whether it was energy, mineral, raw materials or specific agricultural products. The terms of trade fluctuated, but did not systematically cancel out (by their deterioration) the impact of the increase in the volumes exported. Natural comparative advantage, based on mineral resources or agricultural specificity, had a meaning. More than this, the expansion of world markets opened new outlets making it possible to exploit the benefit of cheap labour in certain areas of manufacturing products for those countries which did not have advantages based on their natural resources. The increase in free zones at the end of the period of growth in the post-war era attests to the realism of these calculations, which were realistic at the time.

The construction of the internal market, the centre of all development policies of the time, is not synonymous with the strategy of industrialization by imports substitution, as has too often been stated in order to contrast it to an export-oriented strategy, a strategy which did not exist. The envisaged industry created for itself its own market as much as it replaced previous imports. Added to the growing demand for final consumer products was that for intermediate goods, sometimes for simple capital goods which could be produced locally and for public expenditure on infrastructure.

Modernization, although centered on industrialization, the two were not synonymous. Urbanization, transport and communications, education and social services, all these were aimed at promoting industrialization through available resources and adequately qualified manpower. But these objectives were also pursued for their own ends, in order to build a nation State and to modernize behavior as was expressed in the discourse of non-ethnic nationalism at the time.

Furthermore, there was no strong opposition to "state intervention", (as there is today, an opposition which contrasts state intervention with the spontaneity of the market) - The former being a negative force for development while the latter its driving force. This opposition was neither made nor noted. On the contrary, the good sense shared by all national authorities considered state intervention as an essential element for building markets and for modernization. The radical left - of socialist leaning in its own ideological reading - undoubtedly associated the growth of this state control with the gradual expulsion of private ownership. But the nationalist right, who did not have this objective, was no less interventionist and partisan for state control. Indeed the right viewed the construction of the private interest which it proposed, required, according to it, and justifiably, strict state control. The hair-brained notions of the dominant

discourse today, would not have been listened to, by the right, at that time.

There is today a great temptation to read this history as that of a stage of the expansion of world capitalism, which was said to have performed, more or less certain functions needed for primitive national accumulation and thereby creating the conditions for the next stage, which we are now supposed to be entering, and which is marked by the opening out to the world market and competition in this arena. I will not suggest that we should yield to this temptation. The dominant forces in world capitalism have not "spontaneously" created the model(s) of development. This "development" was imposed on them. It was the product of the national liberation movement of the contemporary third world. The reading which I propose therefore stresses the contradiction between the spontaneous and immediate trends of the capitalist system, (which are always guided only by the short-term financial gain and which characterizes this mode of social management), with the longer-term visions which guide the rising political forces, towards conflict, with the former. This conflict is certainly not always radical; capitalism adjusts itself to it, even profitably. However, capitalism adjusts itself to this conflict but does not generate its movement. I have, therefore, for this reason, proposed to describe the post-war period, particularly the two decades 1955-1975 - as the period of "development ideology", or better still as that of the Bandung National Bourgeois Project (with reference to the Bandung Conference which ushered in the period). In this context, the clash between the dominant forces of world capitalism and those which have guided the "developmentalist" project of Bandung was more or less radical according to whether the state control introduced was intended to replace or support capitalism. The radical wing of the movement joined forces with the former thesis, and on this account, clashed with the immediate interests of the dominant capitalism, particularly through nationalizations and the exclusion of foreign ownership. The moderate wing, on the other hand, agreed to reconcile the conflicting interests, thereby offering greater possibilities for adjustment. At the international level, this distinction between the radical and moderate wings of Bandung was easily adopted to the terms of the East-West conflict between the Soviet block and Western capitalism.

We find in this era both the elements of the common denominator of the national bourgeois development project and the features of the opposition between its radical and moderate tendencies.

The Liberation Movement and Modernization in Africa: "Capitalism without Capitalists"

All liberation movements in Africa shared this modernist vision, for the same reason as the capitalists and bourgeois. This does not imply that the liberation movements were inspired, much less led, by a bourgeoisie, in the full

sense of the term. This bourgeoisie class did not exist, or hardly existed at the time of independence. Even now thirty years later, it only exists in an embryonic form on the most optimistic assumption. But the ideology of modernization, on the other hand, did really exist and was the dominant force giving a meaning to the people's revolt against colonization. This ideology bore a project to which I propose to give the curious name of "capitalism without capitalists". Capitalism by its concept of modernization, expected to produce the relationships of production and the social relationships basic and peculiar to capitalism: such as wage relationship, business management, urbanization, stratified education, the concept of national citizenship. No doubt other values, characteristic of advanced capitalism, like that of political democracy, were woefully lacking, and this was justified by the exigencies of being an early development phase. All countries of the region - radicals and moderates - chose the same formula of the single party, farcical elections and the leader-founder of the Nation syndrome etc... The countries were without capitalists in the sense that there was no middle-class of businessmen for which the State - and its technocrats - was expected to substitute itself. In some cases the emergence of the middle-class was held in suspicion because of the priority that it would give to its immediate interests over the longer-term ones under construction by the State! Thus suspicion led to the exclusion of the middle class in the radical wing of the national liberation movement. This radical wing then believed naturally that its project was that of "building socialism". It then took up the Soviet ideology. The latter i.e. the Soviet, had also reached, in its own way, the stage of "capitalism without capitalists", having made the goal of "catching up" with the developed Western world, the main thrust of its preoccupations.

In Africa, national liberation movements were divided, as elsewhere between radical tendencies called "socialist" and moderate tendencies. This break up, although frank and clear in certain cases, it nevertheless constituted a unified movement in appearance in other cases. Opposition to colonialism was based on a complex amalgam of causes, such as the social classes on which the movement relied - peasants, urban masses, middle classes, privileged classes. For others, it was due to the traditions of their political and organizational training (metropolitan communist parties, trade unions, churches etc.). The speed with which the two principal colonial powers in Africa-Britain and France, conceived their "decolonization" policy of 1960 into 2 blocks - the Casablanca group rallying behind the banners of Nasserism, the Algerian FLN and Nkrumaism; and the Monrovia group, made up of the most loyal pupils of Gaullist France and Liberal England (Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, etc...) Lumumba, in the Congo of the time, was attached to the first group but major forces in his country sympathized more with the second group. The indecision of the Belgian government, which had refused until the last minute to learn the lessons of France and Britain, were largely responsible for the postponement of this conflict in the

Congo territory itself. In answer to the fragile establishment of a Lumumba government in Leopoldville - (then Stanleyville) - the "moderate" forces, supported by Brussels and South Africa, opted for the secession of Katanga and Kasai. Established in Leopoldville, first under Kasavubu and then Mobutu, who later reconciled with Tshombe and "Emperor" Muluba of Kasai. The Congolese example was going to give birth to a new policy of bringing together the radical and moderate camps; but a togetherness which makes the moderate gradually edge out the radicals. Emperor Haile Selassie's genius lay in his understanding that the time had come to seal the reconciliation between the Monrovia and Casablanca groups by the creation in Addis Ababa, in 1963, the Organization of African Unity.

The reconciliation created new conditions for the deployment of the Bandung project in Africa. All the countries joined it formally, thereby becoming members of the "Non-Aligned" Movement, even when they remained on the lap of the Western powers and even under their direct military protection in certain cases. But as a result they acquired a certain ability to manoeuvre, not envisaged from the outset in the neocolonial design. This fact explains why after the initiators of "African socialism" - Ghana, Guinea, Mali - successive generations of radicals of the same calling were able to follow one another in Africa (Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Tanzania, etc...). A curious fact considering the fragility of the states of this content faced with imperialist pressures. This also explains why Mobutu has been able to have a margin which enhances nationalist extravagances that are otherwise difficult to understand.

During the Bandung era, whatever the objectives of the countries were in terms of their development ideology, of their national and middle-class project of "capitalism without capitalists", or in terms of the modalities of implementation, or the uncertainties of their relationships in the conflict of the super powers, the results between the various group of countries were very different - sometimes extreme differences.

The evolution of the results of the Bandung project is obviously dependent on the criteria selected to define "development" an ideological concept whose content is always vague.

If we adopt the criterion of the national liberation movement, that is "national construction" the results are on the whole debateable. The reason is that whereas the development of capitalism in earlier times supported national integration in industrial countries, the globalization operating in the peripheries of the system, on the contrary, breaks up societies. However, the ideology of nationalist movement ignored this contradiction, having been enclosed in the bourgeois concept of "making up for a historic backwardness" and conceiving this catching up by participation in the international division of labour (and not its negation by delinking). No doubt, according to the specific characters of pre-capitalist pre-colonial societies, this disintegration impact was more or less dra-

matic. In Africa, whose artificial colonial demarcation did not respect the previous history of its peoples, the disintegration wrought by capitalist peripherization made it possible for ethnicism to survive, despite the efforts of the ruling class to get rid of it after national liberation/independence. When the crisis came, suddenly destroying the accumulated surplus which had financed the trans-ethnic policies of the new state, the ruling class itself broke up into fragments which, having lost every legitimacy based on the achievements of "development", tried to create for themselves new bases often associated with ethnic retreat.(1)

On the other hand, if we adopt the criterion of "socialism" to evaluate the "developmentalism era", between countries contrasted "socialism" where should be understood to be the populist ideology used by the radicals. It was a progressive vision laying emphasis on maximum social mobility, the reduction in income disparities, a sort of full employment in urban areas, in some way a poor version of the welfare state. From this viewpoint, the achievements of a country like Tanzania for example, offers a remarkable contrast with those of Zaire, Côte d'Ivoire or Kenya where the most extreme inequalities have been felt continually for thirty years both in times of sharp economic growth and in times of slump.

However, the criterion which conforms most to the logic of capitalist expansion - a concept which is different from the ideological one of development - is that of a country's ability to be competitive in world markets. From this point of view the results in Africa contrasts brutally with the principal countries of Asia and Latin America, which have become competitive industrial exporters, while all African countries have remained exporters of primary products. The former are the new third world (the periphery of tomorrow in my view), and the latter (Africa) is what we now call "the fourth world", which is expected to be further marginalized in the new stage of capitalist globalization. (2)

This explanation of the failure of Africa as a whole should bring into play all the complexity of the interactions between specific internal conditions and the logic of world capitalist expansion. Because these interactions are too often ignored, current explanations - both those advanced by the economists of the international economy and by the nationalists of the third world - remain superficial.

The economist lay emphasis on phenomena which they isolate from the overall logic of the system, like the corruption of the political class, the weakness of its economic foundations, the very low productivity of agriculture, (still not up to the age of animal draught), ethnic fragmentation, etc. Presented this way, these studies call inexorably for recommending their solution by a greater insertion of Africa into world capitalism. Africa would need true "capitalist businessmen", who would break the impediment to self-reliance of the rural community by the systematic promotion of commercial agriculture etc.. This reasoning is inad-

equate because it ignores the overall system in the framework of which the proposed reforms would operate. They ignore, for example, that the capitalist approach to agriculture would produce huge masses of surplus populations, which in the current state of technologies, could not be employed in industry as they were in 19th century Europe. History does not repeat itself.

On the other hand, the nationalists stresses other phenomena, no less real, like the fact that the prices of raw materials on which depends the financing capacity to take-off are deteriorating systematically. Third world nationalists also cite, justifiably, the numerous political, and even sometimes military, interventions of the Western powers, always hostile to the forces of progressive social change, which always came to the rescue of reactionary and archaic forces. But these arguments are not structurally linked to the logic of internal conflicts and so they oppose the "external" to the "nation" and thereby skip the latter's.

The study of the failure which I have outlined here, highlights the responsibilities of colonialism and the ruling classes associated with neocolonialism which pursue their interest and also considerations of imperialism's global geo-strategy.

The international division of labour which creates the unequal contrast between the industrialized centres and the un-industrialized peripheries dates back to the industrial revolution of the early 19th century in Europe. It implies that the latter participate in world trade by exporting products for which they have an advantage based on nature and not on the productivity of their labour. The rule is therefore as valid for Africa from its colonization at the end of the last century, as for the other peripheries of Asia and Latin America which, from this point of view, do not distinguish themselves from it until the second World War. One, therefore, understands why the European powers went to attack Africa which they shared among themselves at the conference of Berlin (1885).

Once conquered, it was necessary to "develop" Africa. For capitalism to "develop" Africa, its requirements were the exploitation of the various regions of the continent. This requirement inevitably clashed with that of societies. Looked at this way, we could begin to understand the three models of colonization which took place in Africa; (i) the trading economy incorporating a small peasantry into the world tropical products market by subjecting it to the authority of a market of controlled monopolies and thus making it possible to reduce the regards for peasant labour to the minimum and to waste land; (ii) the economy of Southern Africa's reserves organized around mining, supplied with cheap labour by forced migration coming from the "reserves" to enhance the perpetuation of traditional rural subsistence; (iii) the economy of pillage which the concessionaire companies embarked upon by taxing without the counterpart of forming products and where neither the local social conditions permitted the establishment of "trading", nor the mineral resources justified the organization of "reserves" intended to furnish abundant manpower. The Congo basin belonged to this third category. (3)

Yet, the results of this mode of inserting Africa into world capitalism were going to prove catastrophic for Africans. Colonial development is indeed responsible for the major drawbacks which afflict up till now the destiny of the Continent.

First it delayed - by a century - any commencement of an agricultural revolution. A surplus could here be extracted from the labour of the peasants and from the national wealth without investments or modernization (no machines or fertilizer), without genuinely paying for the labour (reproducing itself in the framework of the traditional self-sufficiency), and without even guaranteeing the maintenance of the natural conditions of reproduction of wealth (pillage of the agrarian soils and the forest). In the regions where the economy of pillage was practiced, the backwardness caused by this mode of development, were maximal. This destructive effect was nevertheless partly compensated for in the Belgian Congo by the creation of an industrial embryo more precocious than elsewhere. I am here referring to the import substitution industries established in Kinshasa (then known as Leopoldville) after the second World War, which must be attributed to the opening up of Belgium itself to foreign competition, at a time when France and England were protecting themselves against it. However history subsequently showed that it was only a fragile embryo not even the beginning of an industrial revolution.

Simultaneously, this mode of development of natural resources tapped in the framework of the unequal international division of labour of the time, excluded the formation of any local middle-class. On the contrary, each time that the latter started the process of its formation, the colonial authorities hastened to suppress it (4).

The weaknesses of the national liberation movement and of the inheritor states of colonization date back to this colonial fashioning. They are therefore not the products of the pristine pre-colonial Africa, which disappeared in the colonization storm, as is explained by the ideology of global capitalism. Capitalism derives its legitimacy in Africa from propounding this usual racist explanation discourse. The "criticism" of independent Africa, - of its corrupt political middle classes, of the lack of economic direction, of the tenacity of rural community structures etc - such criticism forget that these features of contemporary Africa were forged between 1880 and 1960.

No wonder then that neocolonialism has perpetuated these features. The political teams which were in charge of independent Africa were not necessarily artificially constituted of junior civil servants even amongst those countries which accepted the neocolonial option. The weaknesses of African countries were those of peripheral capitalism as it has been forged in Africa. Suffice it to say that the responsibility of the metropolis was great. For despite the shortcomings of colonial society, when the liberation movement had produced elites potentially capable of going further, all effort was made to destroy these opportunities for Africa to get out of the rut.

The form that this failure took is quite fully defined by the limits of the famous Lomé Agreements which have linked - and continue to link - sub-Saharan Africa to Europe of the EEC. These agreements have indeed perpetuated the old division of labour-relegating independent Africa to the production of raw materials, at the very time when - during the Bandung period (from 1955 to 1975) - elsewhere the third world was embarking on the industrial revolution. They have made Africa lose about thirty years at a decisive moment of historic change. Undoubtedly, African ruling classes were, here, partly responsible for what was going to start the involution of the continent, particularly when they joined the neocolonial camp against the aspirations of their own people, whose weaknesses they exploited.

The collusion between African ruling classes and the global strategies of imperialism is therefore, definitively, the ultimate cause of the failure. We then find, in the workings of such collusions, all the dimensions of the concerns of the strategy of imperialism in the post-war period (1945-1990), in particular its geo-strategic dimension. Zaire, as part of southern Africa (through Katanga) has for this reason, paid the price of the geo-strategy of the post-war imperialism. The entire region, from Katanga (now Shaba) Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to South Africa - was, for the American camp of the cold war, a unique strategic zone, important for its mineral resources (including the rare minerals and gold of South Africa) and for its location, controlling communications between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The USSR of the time sought to break these positions of the enemy by forming an alliance with the African national liberation movements, especially the most radical among them, in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa (5). The Western powers responded by their support, practically without any condition, to the regimes in Zaire, Malawi, Kenya, despite their anti-democratic practices.

It is similar geo-strategic considerations which explain the hostility of the Western powers to the middle classes of North Africa and the Middle East, i.e. the Arab world. Here the region's importance lay in its oil wealth and its geographic position, on the flank of the USSR of the time. These strategies were also partly responsible for the Arab failure. Inversely, geo-strategic considerations compelled the Western imperialists to support or at least to tolerate, the initiatives of the middle-classes of East Asia, which partly explains at least the "successes" of this region in the period of post-war capitalist expansion.

Part II: The Future: What Prospects for Africa

What has the "Bandung Modernization" achieved?

The achievements of the Bandung period have been very unequal. Since the

whole project was a project of “modernization in the framework of global interdependency” and not at all a project of “delinking”, the criterion used to measure and qualify the achievements has to be consonant with the logic of globalized capitalism.

Therefore, this criterion should be the capacity of the new industries in the periphery to be competitive on global markets. This is a criterion totally independent of the conventional debates (internal/external markets - import substitution/export oriented industries). Also false is the debate as to whether modernization was a stage of capitalist development, or a transition to “socialism”.

We can classify the achievements of “modernization” into four groups:

Successful industrialization i.e. countries which are competitive on global markets, or can be with adjustments in macro-policies (rate of exchange, taxation policies etc.). At least many (or some at least) of the industries of major Latin American countries (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina), East Asia (the 2 Korea, Communist China, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore, and to a less extent Malaysia, Thailand), India in part, perhaps some Arab countries (Egypt and Algeria). Also in a broad sense, Russia and Eastern Europe.

Unsuccessful industrialization i.e. countries which one cannot imagine becoming “competitive”. Adjustments needed are much more important than in the previous case. Probably most Arab industrialized countries belong to that group. The same is true for Nigeria and South Africa. The danger here is that instead of “rebuilding the industrial set up it will be “destroyed” (de-industrialization).

Successful development (growth) within the old division of labour, i.e. providing raw materials. Oil countries (Gulf countries, some African: Nigeria, Angola) are typical, since other mineral resources, basically copper for Africa (Zaire, Zambia), suffer a long structural demand crisis. but also some “tropical agricultural”, as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Malawi.

Unsuccessful growth even within those limits of the old division of labour. This is the case of most of sub-Saharan Africa. These difficulties were not necessarily the product of “bad policies”, but of objective conditions. For instance, that this type of development had already been achieved in the colonial times and reached its ceiling by 1960. This is the case of Ghana: the Côte d’Ivoire miracle was just a matter of “catching up” with colonial West African coast achievements!

The first group represents the core of the periphery of tomorrow. I call it

“outputting” industrialization for the global market. This industry will be controlled by the centers through what I call their 5 new monopolies:

- monopoly of high technology;
- monopoly of control of the global financial system;
- monopoly of control of access to natural resources at the global level (control of environment discourse);
- monopoly of control of mass media and therefore capacity to manipulate opinions at global level;
- monopoly of weapons of mass destruction.

Groups 2, 3 and 4, meaning all of Africa, belong to the “marginalized periphery” of the next generation. This is the challenge.

Who is responsible for this often called “Fourth Worldization” of Africa? The easy answer, in fact based on a deep racist prejudice, is that “Africa was so backward... Its independence came too early, it was not mature ...” Or, some other pseudocultural or rather culturalist - argument: “African philosophies”, Africa does not want to develop.

Those primarily responsible are of course the ruling classes. But these ruling classes have been supported by the West, in many cases “created by them. Their dictatorship has been supported but also the “good ruling classes”, or at least “development-oriented” have not been able to go beyond the old division of labour, for objective reasons related to their position in the global system. As a result, they were limited to populist approaches even if they came with a socialist label.

Also the responsibility of EEC Europe is here very important. Through the EEC-ACP “association” (the Lomé conventions), the EEC has given a second life to the old division of labour - preferences for raw material exports, open markets, etc. This only paved the way for a more severe crisis further down the road.

New Vision and New Strategies

What can be done now? We must examine seriously a combination of middle-run and long-run perspectives in the new global framework. By this I mean:

- (a) It is not possible to disregard the long run and the global system. Therefore, in the long run Africa has also to industrialize, and to be competitive.

But this is very far, and to go in this direction the global, system must be reshaped in a way allowing for a long transition based on: “delinking” in the frame of large regions of Third World, in the form of the “Pan-African region”, “Pan-Arab region” etc. Delinking does not mean autarky, even within these large regions. However, it should allow for a large preference for internal industrial complementarity, even if it is not competitive in international markets over “external-oriented”. Large regions are the only way to limit the negative effects of the five above-mentioned monopolies. A global (or rather pluri-regional) negotiated and controlled interdependency.

(b) Immediately, at the level of nation states as they are, fighting for: a popular development, i.e. growth for the benefit of the vast majorities. It implies here the industry to support an agricultural revolution, transforming the over-exploited “informal” sectors into “popular economy” with a capacity to negotiate collectively;

Protecting this popular development from the devastations of uncontrolled openness.

Building popular autonomous political forces. This is really the political precondition. The struggle for democracy must be put in this framework. Struggle not only for formal political democracy (multi-partyism, elections etc.) but also for progressive democratization of society. It implies a struggle for transforming gender relations etc.

The International Aid System and Africa

1. Africa has indeed benefitted from a significant volume of foreign aid during the 1980s and the 1970. Yet these volumes have always been over-estimated:

(a) No serious calculation has ever been produced to measure the outflows of profits extracted from Africa, which remained during those decades much more “open” than other developing regions. My attempts to measure these outflows in some cases led me to the conclusion that the outflows of (private) capital and profit may well have been more important than the inflows of (public) aid.

(b) the marginal efficiency of much of this aid was very small, if positive. Much of the aid was purely “political”, to support the establishment of clientelist states. In that respect the real costs of “projects” (whenever these projects made sense) was overestimated allowing the elites to get their “commission”. Corruption was, therefore built-in and encouraged by donors, albeit cynically.

2. The balance and “inflows of aid - out-flows” moved dramatically in favour of the “donors” as of 1980, with the debt crisis and the adjustment programmes. As a result, it is poor Africa which is massively ‘subsidizing’ the rich West. There is no more real aid.

3. In any case, the blame for the “failure of development” is put exclusively on the African states and political establishments, as if these could be considered as separate from the global ruling system. That kind of argument has made it fashionable to direct aid towards NGOs. Here we ought to qualify the results of this new orientation.

No doubt, in some cases, the powers being who they are, and the people starting to organize, it is not impossible that this new form of aid is more efficient, particularly when the use of it is directly linked to popular or small projects etc. Yet even here a serious discussion of the criteria is needed.

This type of aid cannot reverse the trend, as long as major changes both at the local national-political level and at the level of the global economic and political system are not guaranteed.

4. We do need to start developing a discussion on a “real pattern of aid” in favour of the people, and as a basis for rebuilding a popular internationalism to face the internationalism of capital.

This discussion must integrate all the dimensions of the problem, i.e.:

- What type of global system, economic (here we find again delinking, regionalization, industrialization to support the rural revolution etc.), and political (what I call a pluricentric system);
- What type of national local social ruling alliances, integrating the urban and rural popular classes, creating conditions for a “cultural” progressive change (democracy, gender relations, etc.).
- Finally we must ask what kind of local popular organizations are the most in keeping with these targets?

Notes

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3. S. Amin, Unequal Development, M.R., New York 1976 pp 278 à 296. S. Amin et C. Coquery Vidrovitch, Historire économique du Congo 1980-1968, Anthropos, Paris 1969.
4. S. Amin, Nco Colonialism in West Africa, Penguin 1973. S. Amin, Le monde des affaires sénégalais, Minuit, Paris 1969.
5. S. Amin, Re-reading the Post War Period, An Intellectual Itinerary, MR, New York, 1994, Chap V.
6. Mondialisation et Accumulation, op. cit., Chap. IV (Afrique du Sud au sein du système global ou les enjeux de la lutte pour la démocratisation).
7. Fayçal Yachir, Mining in Africa today, ZED, London 1988.