

Contra Hardt and Negri

Multitude or Proletarianization?

SAMIR AMIN

This critique was inspired by Amin’s reading of the massive tome by left theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri bearing the title Commonwealth (2011). He wrote it as a follow up to his critique “Empire and Multitude,” Monthly Review (November 2005), which addressed Hardt and Negri’s earlier books: Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004). —The Editors

The term multitude was first used in Europe, it seems, by the Dutch philosopher Spinoza, to whom Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explicitly refer. It then designated the “common people” who were a majority in the cities of the Ancien Régime and deprived of participation in political power (reserved for the monarch and the aristocracy), economic power (reserved to property owners of feudal ancestry or from the nascent financial bourgeoisie, both urban and rural—the rich peasants), and social power (reserved to the Church and its clerics). The status of the common people varied. In the city, they were artisans, small merchants, pieceworkers, paupers, and beggars; in the country, they were landless. The common people in the cities were restless and frequently exploded into violent insurrections. They were often mobilized by others—particularly the nascent bourgeoisie, active component of the Third Estate in France—in their conflicts with the aristocracy.

Similar social forms had existed earlier and elsewhere. The plebeians of ancient Rome and the city-states of Renaissance Italy are well known. In the English revolutions of the seventeenth century, the Levellers, who emerged in the conflict between Cromwell and the Crown, belonged to the same sort of social strata. For my part, I have observed that similar social realities may be found elsewhere outside of Europe, such as with the Taipings in nineteenth-century China.

The vicissitudes of the French Revolution provided the space for an even stronger intervention by these plebs (the multitude of that time) in the conflict between the bourgeoisie of the Third Estate, on one side, and

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1 the monarchy and aristocracy, on the other. The conflict rapidly became
2 three sided (aristocracy, bourgeoisie, people) and the plebeian compo-
3 nent had the upper hand for a while in 1793 with the political group
4 known as The Mountain. Robespierre clearly expressed the demands
5 of these plebs: he contrasted the “people’s political economy with the
6 political economy of the proprietaires [owners of fortunes]” (using these
7 same strikingly modern terms, as Florence Gauthier points out).¹

8 An initial general observation: the revolts of the plebs are proof that
9 human beings have not always accepted the oppression, lack of rights,
10 or poverty to which they have been subjected by various social systems
11 in different times and places. The dialectic of the conflict between the
12 desire for freedom by human beings (a matter of anthropology) and the
13 inequality that is imposed on them (a matter of political sociology) is a
14 permanent transhistorical reality.

15 A second observation: all of the revolts of the plebs—the ancient
16 multitude—were defeated. Should we conclude from this, in a strongly
17 economic and determinist interpretation of history, that this was
18 because the demand of the plebs (a type of communism based on the
19 aspiration to equality) was not a possibility, and the development of the
20 productive forces implied the invention of capitalism and the exercise
21 of power by the bourgeoisie as its representative? I will not discuss
22 these issues further here, despite their importance for understanding
23 Marx and historical Marxisms. Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval offer
24 a magnificent analysis of these issues to which I shall refer.²

25 The early anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon used the very term
26 “multitude” in the middle of the nineteenth century to describe the
27 social reality of the urban France of his time (Paris in particular);
28 Dardot and Laval explicitly refer to this.³ This description was, for his
29 time, perfectly correct, in my opinion (and in Marx’s opinion, it seems,
30 since he offered no complaints about it). In Restoration France, during
31 the July Monarchy, and in the Third Empire, political and economic
32 power was reserved to the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, themselves
33 segmented and in conflict, but ultimately united in a sharing of power
34 modulated by changes in the specific weight of each side. The common
35 people, who were in the majority in Paris and other large cities, were
36 excluded. Within that diverse group, the new industrial proletariat
37 was still in its formative stage and in the minority. They were primarily
38 found in the new textile industry and the coal mines. Proletarianization
39 had hardly begun in France, though it was more advanced in England.
40 In the history of France, this multitude (or plebs) continued to be

active. It had not forgotten 1793, and in 1848 and even (partly) in 1871
aspired to return to that moment. Yet, once again, it failed.

Having said that, I do not believe it is useful to retain the term
multitude to describe later time periods, in France, Europe, or elsewhere
in the world, particularly for contemporary societies. I would even say
that this term becomes dangerously deceptive.

The long-term, immanent tendency of capital accumulation,
triumphant from the second half of the nineteenth century, is to
proletarianize, i.e., to transform the diverse members of the common
people (the plebs, the multitude) into sellers of their labor power
to capital, either “really” or “formally,” as Marx analyzed it. To be
proletarian is a new status, one that is continually changing and that
continues to develop up to the present.

This proletarianization inexorably advances through the always
unique combination (specific to a time and place) formed by (1) the
technological requirements of the organization of capitalist production,
(2) the struggles of the proletarians either against this capitalist
organization itself or to find a more favorable place in it, and (3) the
strategies developed by capital in response to proletarian struggles,
with the objective of fragmenting the proletariat. There is nothing new
here in principle, although the result of any given combination is always
unique and specific to a particular moment in the deployment of capital
accumulation within the local context of national capitalism, but also
at the regional level in the nation/state in question. These combinations
structure all of global capitalism in quite specific ways, defined by
equilibriums/disequilibriums in international relations. In particular,
they form the contrasts characteristic of proletarianization in the
(unequally) dominant centers and the dominated peripheries, thereby
maintaining the various functions necessary for global accumulation.

There are, then, good reasons to look at proletarianization more
closely and concretely, avoiding overzealous and excessively broad
generalizations. It is true that the historical Marxisms of the Second
and Third Internationals, unfortunately, often succumbed to the
temptation of making generalizations of this kind and, consequently,
reserved the term proletariat to one segment of the latter. Examples of
this exclusive use of the term proletariat are factory workers or miners
in the nineteenth century and workers in the large factories of the 1920s
to ‘60s organized along Fordist lines.

The fixation on these particular segments of the proletariat explains—
without excusing—the errors in the strategies for the class struggle

1 developed by the historical Internationals. In certain places and at certain
2 times, these segments of the proletariat found themselves in a context
3 more favorable to pursuing their struggles. The fixation on these seg-
4 ments and their struggles, which were victorious to a certain extent, can
5 thus be understood. The social advances of the postwar reformist state
6 (the Welfare State) were a result. But the strength of the movements that
7 made these advances possible hid their weakness. Fixated only on the
8 segments of the proletariat in question, the movement forgot the others,
9 whether proletarianized or in the process of proletarianization in other
10 conditions and forms—particularly the peasantry. This neglect made
11 it impossible to call capitalism into question, and thus encouraged the
12 reintegration of the advanced segment of the proletariat and its submis-
13 sion to the logic of accumulation.

14 For my part, I have proposed an interpretation quite different
15 from that of Hardt and Negri, which I have called a “generalized
16 proletarianization” of the contemporary world beginning, let us say,
17 in 1975. I emphasize in this interpretation both the proletarian status
18 imposed on everyone and the extreme segmentation of the generalized
19 proletariat, just as I emphasize the concomitance—not by chance—
20 between these two characteristics, on the one hand, and the extreme
21 centralization of capital’s control, on the other.

22 A rapidly growing proportion of workers are no more than sellers of
23 their labor power to capital, directly when they are company employees
24 or indirectly when they are reduced to the status of subcontractors,
25 despite the apparent autonomy conferred on them by their legal
26 status. For example, in family agriculture, titles to property (in land
27 and equipment) are rendered meaningless because of the deductions
28 imposed, both upstream and downstream, by capitalist monopolies.
29 Most small and medium companies producing manufactured objects
30 or services as well as “freelance” work belong to the same reality: the
31 generalization of proletarianization. Today, all or almost all workers
32 sell their labor power, including cognitive, if necessary.

33 In these conditions, the evolution of the system does not reduce the
34 area in which the law of value is at work, but, contrary to what Hardt and
35 Negri say, demonstrates with greater power than ever its harsh reality. In
36 the diagram I have used to illustrate this question the law of value oper-
37 ates through the hierarchy of salaries (and more generally the payments to
38 subject labor).⁴ All workers (80 or 90 percent?) provide, say, eight hours
39 of work per day for 250 days per year to produce goods and services (use-
40 ful or not!). But the remuneration of their labor allows them to purchase

only an overall volume of goods and services that required only four hours 1
of annual labor [JBF: should this be “four hours of labor per day”?]. They 2
are all (productive or unproductive) equally exploited by capital. 3

I rounded out this analysis by analyzing the vertiginous growth of 4
the surplus absorbed in a Department III, which comes to supplement 5
Department I (production of goods and services for production) and 6
Department II (production of goods and services for final consumption).⁵ 7
Segmentation of the generalized proletariat mainly finds its explanation 8
in the strategies implemented by capital of the generalized monopolies 9
(the contradictory complement necessary to the emergence of a 10
generalized proletariat) to initiate and control the direction given to 11
technological research, which is designed to encourage the segmentation 12
in question. This segmentation, however, is not the unilateral product 13
of the strategies implemented by capital. The resistance of the victims 14
and the struggles that they undertake interact with these strategies 15
and give particular forms to the segmentation. There are well known 16
concrete examples: the solidarity developed in these struggles—such 17
as among the railway workers of the SNCF in France—attenuates 18
in some ways the devastating effects of the generalized proletariat’s 19
segmentation, yet simultaneously reinforces it. 20

These strategies for struggle at first sight prove Alain Touraine to be right 21
in what he says about contemporary society and the social movements 22
specific to each of its segments. The objective of an effective strategy 23
for a common struggle consists precisely in identifying strategic sub- 24
objectives that allow unity in diversity. 25

There are certainly no blueprints that provide an answer to this challenge. 26
But Hardt and Negri do not help us to advance militant thinking in 27
this area. Their insistence on the significance of the liberating effects 28
produced by spontaneous struggles is disproportionate. Recognizing 29
the reality of these liberating effects is straightforward and certainly 30
does not require any pompous analysis. The real difficulty arises as 31
soon as we pose this question: How do we articulate the segmentary 32
struggles into a strategy for wide-ranging and generalized struggle? 33
Hardt and Negri have nothing to say about this. 34

Generalized proletarianization and its segmentation go hand in hand 35
with changes in the structure of capital. The transition to monopolies in 36
their initial form (from 1880 to 1975), then into their contemporary form, 37
which I have called generalized monopolies, typifies these changes. The 38
centralization of the power of these monopolies—without a parallel con- 39
centration in the legal ownership of capital—completely transforms the 40

1 nature of the bourgeoisie as well as the management of political power in
2 the service of abstract capital's domination. The bourgeoisie is itself now
3 largely made up of salaried agents of abstract capital, in particular pro-
4 ducers of knowledge useful for capital, these cognitive values that Hardt
5 and Negri never define precisely enough to assess their significance.
6 These salaried agents, while they work eight hours, receive compensa-
7 tion that allows them to buy goods and services the production of which
8 cost more, even much more, than eight hours. They do not, then, partici-
9 pate in the production of surplus value, but are consumers of it. They are
10 bourgeois and are conscious of being so. I refer here to the analyses in *The*
11 *Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism* that I have devoted to this evolution, to
12 which Hardt and Negri have never paid any attention.⁶

13 The preceding analysis focuses only on transformations in the centers
14 of the system. The diverse forms of proletarianization in the societies of
15 peripheral capitalism are different and specific. I will return to that in
16 my critique of Hardt and Negri on the subject of imperialism.

17 We are, then, quite far from a step backward towards a diversification
18 of statuses similar to that which characterized the multitude in the
19 past. In fact, we are in the exact opposite situation. Before Hardt and
20 Negri, Touraine had confused the new segmentation with the "end of
21 the proletariat," and in that vein, substituted the struggle of "social
22 movements" (in the plural) specific to each of these segments in the
23 new social reality for the struggle of the proletariat (in the singular).
24 Hardt and Negri go back to Touraine, which is implied by their return
25 to the term multitude. In their view, the capitalist law of value is on the
26 decline (for me, it is expressed with growing force) and being replaced
27 by a flowering of modes of exploiting labor similar to those from the
28 past prior to proletarianization and the law of value. But Hardt and
29 Negri say nothing specific about this flowering of forms of labor. Their
30 silence about this is eloquent: they do not know what to substitute for
31 the law of value. Marx said that the tumult of the waves in the market
32 masked the power of the law of value, which completely controlled
33 the movements of these waves. Likewise, I will say that the diversity
34 of the components of proletarianized society (the multitude) masks in
35 a similar way the power of the law of value, more precisely the law of
36 globalized value, which forms that diversity.

37 Instead of analyzing the concrete forms of the generalized
38 proletariat's segmentation, Hardt and Negri revel in a discourse on
39 the "commons" ("commonwealth"), which does not contribute much,
40 despite its length and repetitiveness, to what has long been known

on the subject. There are writings on the “commons” that both clarify 1
 fundamental concepts much better than Hardt and Negri do, and 2
 which also challenge those concepts that allow the dominant ideology 3
 of the market to integrate externalities in its system.⁷ 4

For their silence on the reality of contemporary social diversity, 5
 Hardt and Negri substitute endless analyses under titles such as 6
 “biopolitics” and “cognitive capitalism.” 7

To call politics “biopolitics” does not bother me, even though 8
 Michel Foucault and, subsequently, Hardt and Negri see something 9
 new there. But I am not convinced that there is anything new. For 10
 me, politics have always been biopolitics—management of human life, 11
 individual and social. Like Dardot and Laval—and Marx, I believe— 12
 whose analyses concerning the articulation between anthropology and 13
 sociology I share, when examining the “practical activity of individuals” 14
 (Dardot and Laval’s inspired terms), I attempt never to separate the 15
 transhistorical (but not transcendent!) anthropological foundation 16
 from the sociohistorical framework in which that activity takes place. 17

I will not go back over the myth of the transformation of industrial cap- 18
 italism into cognitive capitalism. Every form of production in every age 19
 of human history has always included a decisive cognitive component. 20

I will say no more about any of these issues. The reader will find 21
 analyses on these questions in my books.⁸ I do not want to present here 22
 any dangerously simplifying summary of these contributions. 23

Empire or Imperialism? 24

Hardt and Negri’s theses rest on two assertions: (1) The globalization 25
 of the system has reached a stage such that any attempt to implement 26
 any sort of national policy is destined to fail; as a result, the concepts 27
 of nation and national interest are outmoded. (2) This reality affects 28
 all states (despite their still formal existence, of course), including the 29
 dominant—sometimes hegemonic—powers, and that, consequently, 30
 there is no more imperialism, but only an “empire” whose center is 31
 nowhere. The centers of economic and political decision-making are 32
 dispersed throughout the planet and dispense with state policies. 33

These two propositions are utterly false and can be explained only 34
 by a total ignorance of the history of capitalist globalization since its 35
 origin five centuries ago up to the present. This history, consisting 36
 of the construction of an opposition between dominant centers and 37
 dominated peripheries and the consequent subjection of modes of 38
 accumulation in the peripheries to the requirements of accelerating 39

1 and deepening accumulation in the centers, is completely ignored
2 by Hardt and Negri. Imperialism is nothing other than the totality of
3 the economic, political, and military means mobilized to produce the
4 submission of the peripheries, today as yesterday.

5 The shaping of the societies of peripheral capitalism produced forms
6 of proletarianization specific to each region according to the func-
7 tions that were assigned to them, and hence different from the forms
8 of proletarianization found in the dominant centers, yet nevertheless
9 complementary to them. The apparent “multitude,” i.e., the diversified
10 whole of working classes integrated into the global system, is struc-
11 tured in a particular manner from one country to another, from one
12 phase of global capitalist development to another.

13 The processes of proletarianization (I use this term deliberately even
14 if they immediately appear as processes of dispossession, exclusion,
15 and pauperization) in the peripheries do not reproduce, with a delay,
16 those that formed (and continue to form) the structures of the societ-
17 ies in the dominant centers. Underdevelopment is not a delay, but the
18 concomitant product of development. The social structures produced
19 in the peripheries are also not vestiges of the past. The submission of
20 these societies distorted the earlier structures and shaped them in such
21 a way as to make them useful to imperialist expansion of global capital-
22 ism (which is inherently polarizing). Workers in the informal sector,
23 for example—continually growing in number and proportion in the
24 peripheral South—are not vestiges of the past, but products of capitalist
25 modernity. They are not marginalized excluded, but segments of labor
26 completely integrated into the system of capitalist exploitation. Here let
27 me make an analogy with the domestic labor of women: this informal
28 labor—non- or poorly remunerated—makes it possible to reduce the
29 price of labor power employed in the formal segments of production.

30 Hardt and Negri loftily ignore the concrete analysis of these situations,
31 which have been the subject of many important works. Their naive view
32 of globalization is the one served up by the dominant discourse. The only
33 sources of information and inspiration to which Hardt and Negri refer
34 are drawn from *Foreign Policy* magazine, through which the Washington
35 establishment sells its goods and which they eagerly consume.

36 In this view, transnationalization has already abolished the reality of
37 nations and imperialism. Washington wants everyone to believe this in
38 order to eliminate the power of protest. For my part, I have reached the
39 opposite conclusion: transnationalization has in no way created a global
40 bourgeoisie, leaving aside the question of whether the latter has—or

does not yet have!—a world state at its service. The expansion of the capitalist/imperialist system of the contemporary globalization of generalized monopolies is based, not on the beginning of the state's decline, but rather on the affirmation of its power. There would be no globalized neoliberalism without an active state, whether that be to take on the functions of the hegemonic power (the United States and its subaltern allies) or in the form of comprador states that secure the submission of the peripheral societies to the requirements of the imperialist domination by the centers. In counterpoint, no advance of peripheral societies can be imagined without the implementation of *sovereign* projects (implemented by national states) that simultaneously combine the construction of a modern and integrated industrial system, the reconstruction of agriculture and the rural world to achieve food sovereignty, the consolidation of social progress, and an openness to the invention of an authentic, progressive, and continual democratization. I stress that any project for national sovereignty must include the working classes and not accept their exclusion. The affirmation of the nation and the construction of a global system as multipolar as possible are not outmoded. To believe that makes it quite simply impossible to construct effective step-by-step strategies, which is exactly what Washington wants!

Negri's error in judgment is well illustrated by his call to vote in favor of the European constitution because the latter—in calling the nation into question—would hinder the development of neoliberal capitalism! Negri does not, then, even see that European construction was devised precisely to consolidate, and not weaken, this development. The—only apparent—reduction in state functions is intended, not to strengthen the power of civil society (to the possible benefit of interventions by the “multitude”), but on the contrary, to eliminate its potentially effective power to protest. The diktats of the Brussels pseudo-state (“non-state”) serve as pretexts to strengthen the reconstruction of national states, formerly based on the social compromise between capital and labor, to be exclusive servants of capital. Simultaneously, European construction makes the continent into a subaltern ally of the leader of the new collective imperialism and consequently even strengthens the capacity of the U.S. state to act.

The Washington establishment perfectly understands what Hardt and Negri persist in denying! The tight control of globalization by the generalized monopolies of the imperialist powers (the United States and its subaltern allies: Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia) is pursued through the permanent deployment of a geostrategy of military control

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1 of the planet. Hardt and Negri have little to say about this (do they
2 then consider NATO's role to be "outmoded"?).

3 Hardt and Negri claim: (1) that the political-military interventions
4 of Washington and its allies have already visibly failed, and (2) that the
5 Washington establishment, having understood this, is in the process of
6 giving them up!

7 The term "failed" deserves serious examination. One can certainly
8 believe that Washington considers it possible—through its political and
9 military interventions designed to support its economic domination—to
10 stabilize the system of comprador states at its service. From this perspec-
11 tive, these interventions have indeed failed. But its interventions have
12 simultaneously destroyed entire societies (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) or
13 are attempting to do so (Syria, Iran, Ukraine, Russia, and others). The
14 possible management of these broken societies by reactionary political
15 Islam (the Muslim Brotherhood and others that the Western media pres-
16 ent in a favorable light) or by the neo-fascisms of Eastern Europe politely
17 described as "nationalisms" does not hinder the consolidation of the
18 imperialist triad's domination of the world system. The chaos produced
19 by the violence of imperialist interventions and the mistakes of the local
20 responses is, then, a second best that Washington has made its objec-
21 tive. From this perspective, Washington has not failed (or at least not
22 yet!). Further, Washington does not recognize this as a failure. On the
23 contrary, the option of rushing headlong into more of the same is all the
24 rage, sustained, among other factors, by the presidential candidacy of
25 the warmonger Hillary Clinton.

26 The other weapon used by the U.S. state to perpetuate its domination
27 is the still almost exclusive use of its dollar as international money.
28 We have recently seen how this weapon was used to subjugate the
29 banks of subaltern allies (the Swiss banks, BNP Paribas) or call to order
30 recalcitrant states in the South (the threat to bankrupt Argentina).

31 There is no money without a state. The dollar is the money of the
32 United States as a state exercising its full sovereignty. The power of the
33 dollar acts effectively through the interventions of the Federal Reserve
34 on the financial market even though these interventions are intended
35 to support monopoly capital. If necessary, the state intervenes here to
36 serve the collective interest of U.S. capitalism against the interests of any
37 given segment of own economy. The view of economic liberalism that
38 the central bank, provided with a status that ensures its independence
39 from the state, allows the market alone to determine the value of money

is nothing but an ideological discourse that is used to make us believe that there is no need for the state to manage the economy.

The situation in the Euro zone is no different, despite appearances. There, the European Central Bank—which is independent from states—acts in fact as an agent to carry out the state policy of the dominant country in the group, Germany. We have seen this function at work in the Greek situation, among others. That is why the IMF never speaks of Europe, but always and only of Germany.

The dollar weapon of the U.S. state is effective insofar as other states accept the asymmetrical legal relations between states: no legal person of U.S. nationality can be tried under any law other than that of the United States, without reciprocity. This is an asymmetry typical of the old imperialist or colonial systems.

The army and money are instruments of the state and not of the market, still less of civil society! There is no capitalism without the capitalist state. On this fundamental question, Hardt and Negri quite simply accept the fashionable ideological rhetoric that is used to hide this reality in order to pretend that capital's beneficial action is hindered by useless and harmful state interventions (which is false).

It is difficult to see how the military strategy of the United States and its control of the globalized financial system can be defeated other than by state policies determined to be free of it all. To view such state policies as useless—even dangerous—is really to capitulate and accept the current imperialist order.

State policies implemented in contemporary capitalism, just as in earlier stages of modern history, are not exclusively economic policies designed to serve the hegemonic bloc dominated by capital; they simultaneously involve all areas of social life, particularly the political management of society. The discourse of capitalism now in fashion claims that the law of the market and the practice of multiparty, representative electoral democracy are essentially the same. This is an absolute abuse of reality that any examination of real history refutes. The state in really existing capitalism (the supposed "market") accepts—even encourages—the appearance of democracy when it suits capital's management of society, while it resorts to other means, autocratic, even fascist, in other circumstances. I refer here to what I have written on the return of fascism to the scene at this time of crisis in the capitalism of generalized monopolies, in which I pointed out the earlier complicity between supposed liberal currents (in the parliamentary right) and fascisms of the past.⁹

Hardt and Negri neglect all that. They accept the dogma of the now fashionable discourse on civil society, which makes it possible for them to credit the interventions of civil society—the resistance and struggles of the exploited, the “multitude”—with an enormous, determinant, and unilateral power that they do not have. Dardot and Laval, who do not share this naïveté, analyze in a completely different way (and I share their analysis) the sometimes conflictual, sometimes complementary dialectic between the state policies of capital and the development of struggles against—or within—these policies. The diverse results of this dialectic depend on specific situations. In some circumstances, capital is forced to retreat and adapt to the advances imposed by such struggles. In such cases, the working classes (the generalized proletariat) then often accept the compromise obtained, internalize its requirements, and consequently become an active force within the logic of the system. These forms of alienation (adopting consumerism) retard the maturation of the anti-capitalist consciousness necessary to go further. In other circumstances, capital succeeds in forming the movement and guiding its orientation. We have seen “multitudes” support fascism.

The now fashionable discourse, spread in particular by *Foreign Affairs*, whose propositions are adopted by Hardt and Negri, wants to make us believe that the interventions of the United States, whether armed or dollar interventions, are inherently favorable to the progress of democracy, i.e., they have a “benign effect.” One has to be completely naive to place any trust in that. Should we forget the state lies continually resorted to by presidents of the United States to justify attacks, yesterday against Iraq, and today against Syria and Russia?

Notes

1. Florence Gauthier, *Triomphe et mort de la révolution des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (Paris: Syllepse, 2014).
2. Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, *Marx, prénom, Karl* (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
3. *Ibid.*, 311.
4. Samir Amin, *Three Essays on Marx's Value Theory* (New York: Monthly Review

Press, 2013), 85, 86.

5. *Ibid.*, 68–69.

6. Samir Amin, *The Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013).

7. See, for example, François Houtart, *Le bien commun de l'humanité* (Mons, Belgium: Couleur livres, 2013).

8. Samir Amin, *The Law of Worldwide Value* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010); *Three Essays on Marx's Value Theory; The Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism*.

9. Samir Amin, “Fascism Returns to Contemporary Capitalism,” *Monthly Review* 66, no. 4 (September 2014): 1–12.

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