

**The Importance of the Social Summit of the United Nations  
(Copenhagen, March 1995)**

1. The Social Summit of the United Nations, to be held in Copenhagen in March 1995, is an important event because it reflects the international community's recognition of the fact that development issues call for political, social, ideological, and cultural analyses, and cannot be reduced to economics alone. Recognition, in other words, of the fact that development is a societal project: not the natural outcome of management policies and market expansion, but the potential result of transformation policies whose human and ecological dimension have been fully considered.

The alarm bell has been ringing for several years now. Poverty, unemployment, social disintegration - the three themes of the Summit - are on the rise throughout the world. The factual evidence to this effect is massive and incontrovertible, and participants will be presenting some part of it at this conference. For our part, we will quote a single figure whose bitter eloquence makes comment superfluous : according to the United Nations, the ratio of the quintile of the most favoured human beings in the world to the quintile of the poorest, which stood at 30 to 1 twenty years ago, now stands at 60 to 1. In becoming accustomed to this utter failure of our system, the dominant discourse has internalized its savage implications, claiming that "There Is No Alternative" (the TINA syndrome, as some have dubbed it). In other words, we must "live" with unemployment and social marginalization (and not aspire to their elimination) ; economies and societies necessarily function at varying speeds ; etc... But the peoples of the world do not accept the unacceptable, and their revolts have imposed the holding of this Summit.

2. The success or failure of this summit will depend on its capacity or incapacity to relate the three "social" themes that have defined its agenda to a series of other objectives which are justly considered fundamental by the international community. These are :

\* The necessity of establishing economic expansion on a basis ~~that~~ will guarantee its durability (sustainable development).

\* The necessity of incorporating, in economic choices, the demands associated with preservation of the natural environment, on which the survival of the planet depends.

\* The necessity of ensuring equal treatment for all of the men and all of the women who make up humanity.

\* The necessity of creating the conditions that will enable democracy to blossom in all of its dimensions - political and social, individual and collective - for all peoples, nations, and communities, while preserving the identity of each.

Taken as a whole, these objectives represent a global societal project and provide a definition of "development".

3. For transformational action to be effective, the operation of the system whose evolution towards a given kind of desired development is sought must be subjected to scientific analysis that is as accurate as possible. Thus, the Summit cannot bypass analysis of the "actually existing system" - cannot, for instance, substitute for it a discourse that is ideological in the worst sense of the term, like the discourse on the virtues of the market. The Summit cannot use moral arguments alone to justify the reform proposals that it will have to recommend in its final resolutions. Pious wishes - "adjustment with a human face" - do not adequately meet the challenge. The world's societal development project must be based on reform proposals that have a scientific basis. \*



This is certainly not an easy task. It requires cooperation between specialists from every area of the economic, political and social sciences, and an open and ongoing dialogue between all schools of thought and representatives of all political ideologies and all cultures, without ostracism. Therefore, it requires long-term efforts, rigorously conducted, in a genuinely democratic spirit.

After all, the proposed objectives are nothing less than :

\* To integrate economic and political aspirations in a coherent and viable project. There is no good macroeconomics without good social and cultural politics, and vice versa.

\* To ensure that transformations proposed at the national level, and those proposed for the international system, are implemented in a coherent way.

No general discourse on the inevitability of globalization can avoid recognition of the fact that interdependence must be negotiated, and that we must provide structures to support necessary national developments and correct existing inequalities rather than let them deepen.

To recognize these requirements is to understand that development is not synonymous with market expansion. Yet the dominant discourse refuses to make this distinction. This discourse implies that expansion of markets necessarily "leads" to social progress and democracy, and that "difficulties" (such as "pockets" of poverty, unemployment, and social marginalization) are merely "transitional". Nobody is concerned to find out whether this "transition" is going to last several years or several centuries! Jan Tibergen, with his usual mathematical rigour, has calculated that the implementation of the policies favoured by the World Bank will resolve the social conflicts of our time in exactly 908 years (years, not days or weeks).

This dominant discourse, therefore, has a purely ideological character, based as it is on a "theory without facts" - a theory that is actually contradicted by history. We are speaking of the theory of "pure market forces" (or pure capitalism, to put it more bluntly). This theory is as far removed from the reality of the "actually existing system" (or "actually existing capitalism") as the "principles of socialism", proclaimed ad nauseam, were removed from the reality of the now defunct "actually existing socialism". In fact, it has been suggested that we should view the World Bank documents now flooding the market the way we used to consider Pravda : by reading between the lines, we may be able to guess the nature of the problems occurring in the real world, but the text always carefully avoids analyzing them, restricting itself to the proclamation of eternally valid principles. History always contradicts the conclusions of this type of exercise, but when this happens, the theory is not reexamined - instead, history is criticized for its failure to conform to principles. This is essentially the same method as that of religious fundamentalism.

At times, life nonetheless makes it necessary for reality to be invoked. In such cases, the "theory without fact" is enriched by an empirical collection of "facts without theory". This exercise provides for the incessant presentation of "success stories" (like those in TV soap operas). Examples of these "miracles" are the miracle of Saint Domingue in the 18th century (today's Haïti), the miracle of the Ivory Coast of the 1960's (which is no longer mentioned), and today, the miracle of Korea, whose virtues are endlessly reiterated by the popular media and academic journals. The operation allows for permanent illusion and sustains the credibility of the paratheoretical ideological discourse. Like other institutions of ideological production, the World Bank carries out a superficial "self-criticism" every twenty years, which enables it permanently to maintain its eternal discourse.

As an unfortunate consequence, genuine practitioners of development grow tired of empty rhetoric and become convinced, in turn, that action can be carried out without theory. Many NGOs try to deal with social conflicts by attacking what they consider to be their "roots". In unfavorable macropolitical and macroeconomic contexts, many of their initiatives lose their effectiveness like insufficient rivers in the desert. The enlightened wing of the conservative establishment may not have any major objection to such actions without theory, to the extent that they can be carried out or even supported - financially, that is - without challenging the dogma that There Is No Alternative (the TINA syndrome). As if the history of human societies had ever ceased to be the history of choices between different alternatives ! A "constructive dialogue" may be suggested between the masters of the ideological discourse, who keep a firm hold on the pursestrings as they laud the eternal virtues of the market, and development activists. The same people always win the argument. Sick societies have to "adjust" to the "requirements" of market expansion ; the reverse operation - determining what reforms might adjust the workings of the market to the requirements of an acceptable social development - never occurs.

So the dominant discourse systematically avoids the basic question : how the social drama to be studied by the Summit are generated, and what mechanisms allow the "actually existing system" to produce and reproduce them in real contemporary history. This question must obviously be asked before any attempt is made to design effective reforms that might put an end to the production of poverty and social disintegration.

The World Bank is probably the most striking example of a party that always wins because the dice are loaded and the dialogue is false. In this respect the Bank is almost a caricature. The Bank is not, as it would have us believe, a "development institution", but simply a commercial firm in the exclusive service of the expansion of markets for multinationals. Its

practice, therefore, is simply the practice of managers with business school degrees whose knowledge goes no further than "the art of selling socks to legless people", to borrow the word of a sociologist who has observed the staff of the Bank, from its Chief Executive Officer to its flying experts.

4. The modest contribution of the Third World Forum to this Summit goes against this dominant current. It is our ambition to help reestablish the spirit of criticism and legitimize the will to understand in order to act effectively.

Our contribution is contained in two reports, one dealing with subsaharan Africa, the other with the Arab world (Northern Africa and the Middle East). These reports offer a concrete analysis of the mechanisms which have led to social catastrophe in these parts of the world. In doing so, they attempt to integrate economic and political issues and to articulate both internal and external causal relationships. These reports have benefited from the work carried within the Third World Forum over the past few years by some fifty intellectuals from the region, whose names and contributions are listed in the appendix. Readers will be able to assess their scientific quality and their power to convince.

In this general presentation, we would like to suggest an interpretive approach that might help overcome the abdication of the critical spirit which we are being offered, or indeed coerced into accepting. From this point of view, we will examine the following points :

\* The reasons for the gradual exhaustion of the developmentalist project of the "development decades" (the 1960's and 1970's).

\* The nature of the crisis of the "actually existing" contemporary system and of the objectives which management of the system imposes as priorities.

\* The consequences of crisis management as carried out by a variety of means, including the programs inaccurately known as Structural Adjustment Programs. Under this management, can we hope to see the light at the end of the tunnel, or should we rather expect an unavoidable worsening of the economic, social and political crisis ?

\* The lineaments of a humanist and social alternative.

## II

### Exhaustion of the Developmentalist Models of the Postwar Period

1. For the first three post world war II decades, "development" was the major preoccupation of all regimes. The three major projects were implemented with considerable success : (i) the "welfare state" in the developed West ; (ii) sovietism in the East ; (iii) accelerated modernization in the Third World. All three of these projects either unfolded within the framework of autocentric national economies or - in the case of the countries of the East and the South - aspired to construct such autocentric economies. They differed in their relationship with the world economy : Atlantism, the construction of Europe, in the case of the developed countries of the West ; "negotiated" opening to the world economy in the case of the countries of the South ; quasi-autarchy for the countries of the East. They differed also with regard to the nature of the social forces driving the project in question with respect to political systems. Nevertheless the diversity of differences should not detract from the profound similarity of objectives - the increase in material welfare by economic development, and the strengthening of the Nation within the world.

In fact, the strong growth of the world economy was the product of political developments which favoured "poor" nations and the popular classes in general way, to the detriment of the "unilateral logic of capital". The defeat of fascism contained and limited power relations within all the societies of the world, and between them. In the West it created relations of power significantly more favourable to the working classes than ever in the entire history of capitalism. These new relations of power are the key to the understanding of the "welfare state", a historic compromise between capital and labour. The victory of the Soviet Union and the Chinese revolution created internal and international conditions favouring the development of the countries of the East, and also those of the West, insofar as they contributed to pressures exerted on capital to engage in the historic social democratic compromise. Debates concerning the social nature of these developments - socialist or not ? - and the role of the internal contradictions resulting in its eventual collapse, should not deflect attention from the positive effects of West-East political competition. The simultaneous rise of national liberation movements in the third world - decolonization - and the ability of post-colonial regimes to harness the benefits of East-West competition favoured economic growth in the South, in a number of ways.

For Third World countries, what was involved was nothing less than "catching up", or, in other words, eliminating the historical effects of global polarization.

Surely history since Antiquity has been characterized by unequal development of regions. But it is only in the modern era that polarization has become the immanent by-product of the integration of the entire planet into the world system.

Modern polarization has appeared in successive forms during the evolution of the system. The classical model which grew out of the industrial revolution and henceforth defined the basic forms of capitalism, whereas the peripheries - progres-

sively all of Asia (except for Japan) and Africa, which were added to Latin America - remained rural, non-industrialized, and because of this their participation in the world division of labor was via agriculture and mineral production. This important characteristic of polarization was accompanied by a second equally importance one : the crystallization of core industrial systems as national auto-centered system which paralleled the construction of the national states. Taken together, these two characteristics account for the dominant lines of the ideology of national liberation which was the response to the challenge of polarization : (i) the goal of industrialization as synonym for liberating progress and a means of "catching up" ; (ii) the goal of the construction of nation-states inspired by the models of those in the core. Modernization ideology was thus defined.

Thus, postwar expansion was produced by the adjustment of the strategies of capital to the social conditions imposed on it by democratic and popular forces. This is the exact opposite of the so-called adjustment policies of our time.

2. The post war period (1945-1990) was one of the progressive erosion of the above two characteristics. It was a period of the industrialization of the peripheries - unequal to be sure, but it was the dominant factor which the national liberation movement did its best to accelerate within peripheral states having recently regained their political autonomy. This period was simultaneously one of the progressive dismantling of auto-centric national production systems and their recomposition as constitutive elements of an integrated world productions system. This double erosion was the new manifestation of the deepening of globalization.

In the course of the thirty "golden years" of post war growth, the internationalization of the world economy progressively eroded the capacity of the state to manage modernization, while new dimensions of the problem asserted themselves



(environmental degradation on a planetary scale). In 1968-1971, the world system entered a phase of structural crisis, which continues to this day. The crisis manifests itself in the return of high and persistent unemployment accompanied by a slowing down of growth in the west, the collapse of sovietism, and serious regression in some regions of the third world, accompanied by unsustainable levels of external indebtedness.

Over the past three decades, conditions favourable to the reconstruction of the logic of unilateral capital rule were re-created. But the logic of unilateral capital rule cannot, by and of itself, generate growth - much less development (strong growth, accompanied by full employment and income distribution favouring the popular classes). Based on the exclusive search for the highest financial returns on capital, it tends to produce an unequal distribution of income between social classes, domestically and internationally, which contribute to relative economic stagnation.

3. The accumulation of these transformations resulted in the collapse of the equilibria characteristic of the postwar world-system.

It is not leading by itself to a new world order characterized by new forms of polarization, but to "global disorder". The chaos which confronts us today comes from a triple failure of the system : (i) which has not developed new forms of political and social organization going beyond the nation state - a new requirement of the globalized system of production ; (ii) which has not developed economic and political relationships capable of reconciling the rise of industrialization in the newly competitive peripheral zones of Asia and Latin America with the pursuit of global growth ; (iii) which has not developed a rapport other than an exclusionary one with the African periphery which is not engaged in competitive industrialization. Far from sustaining the progression of globalization, the current chaos reveals its extreme vulnerability.



## III

**Management of the crisis and "Structural Adjustment"**

1. Contemporary society is manifestly in crisis, if we define crisis as a situation in which the expectations of the majority cannot be satisfied by the logic (rules of the game) of the system. People want full employment, improvement in social services, opportunities for social mobility, etc... The unilateral logic of crisis management produces unemployment, impoverishment and marginalization. Nations want independence and dignity. The logic of global crisis management produces the opposite. In this process, states and governments have lost the legitimacy which enable them to intervene in the regulation of social relations in favour of the popular classes, and to defend their national interests on the international scene. Western democracy, sovietism, and the national populism of the Third World - all three are in crisis, or have even disappeared from the scenary. Crisis is due to the fact that the profits cannot find sufficient financially profitable new outlets capable of expanding productive capacity. The "management" of the crisis consists of finding alternative new investments for excess short term financial capital, in order to avert a massive and brutal collapse of financial values as happened in the 1930's. Dominant powers have become aware of this major threat, and since 1980, have undertaken systematic policies for managing the crisis - policies which, from this point of view, are perfectly rational.

2. Crisis management by national governments proceeds by policies of "de-regulation" designed to weaken "rigidities" of trade unionism, dismantle and liberalize prices and wages ; reduce public expenditures (principally subsidies and social service) privatize and liberalize external transactions, etc... The recipe is the same for all governments and its justification is based on the same vague and excessive dogmatism : liberalization "liberates" potential initiatives "victimized by interventionism" and puts the engine of economic growth back

on the rails. But the liberalization in question will ensnare the economy into "deflationist" spirals of stagnation, unmanageable at the international level, multiplying conflicts which cannot be mediated, stuck with the repetition of incantations to the effect that liberalization will - some time in the future - bring "healthy" development. On what basis, what criteria can these policies be judged or evaluated? Nobody knows. At the same time, the legitimation of choice is reinforced by political and ideological propositions which are equally vague - and false - as those advanced concerning economic mechanisms. Economic liberalization is presented as synonymous with political democracy and all critiques of these policies are held to be inadmissible in the name of the defense of democracy. The merits of economic liberalism are praised in the name of "transparency"; the state being considered a priori as the locus of opacity (ignoring the fact that the democratic state provides the best conditions for transparency), while in fact the - very real - opacity of private business protected by "business' confidentiality" escape even a passing mention. Social and economic realities of oligopolies, privileged relations of the private with the public sector, and corruption are not the object of scientific analysis. rarely have we witnessed an ideological discourse, "pur et simple", as extreme as any dogmatic fundamentalism, repeated incessantly by the media and the dominant discourse, as if it were based on established evidence.

The globalization of capital requires a regime of crisis management, such as we have here described. Enormous volumes of short term capital require the subordination of economic mechanisms to unadulterated private profitability criteria. Liberalization of international capital movements, floating exchange rates, high rates of interest, American balance of payments deficits, third world indebtedness, and privatization constitute a perfectly rational set of conditions which offer global capital the possibility of speculative financial profits, to avoid the danger of a massive devaluation of the hypertrophic volume of global financial capital. To gain

some idea of the enormity of the excess volumes of financial capital, we compare the annual value of world trade which is in the region of 3,000 billion dollars with international capital flows of about 80,000 to 100,000 billion dollars, 30 times larger.

In the perspective of crisis management, the international institutions are instruments in the service of the regulation of West-South and new West-East relations. In this context, the function of the IMF and the World Bank (imposition of liberalization, floating of exchange rates, subordination of the economies of South and East to the absolute imperative of debt service) and also the GATT, masquerading behind the discourse of free trade, is the protection of market control by the dominant transnational oligopolies. The G7 try to coordinate the set of these crisis management policies, with no attempt to attack either the basic problems of the crisis, nor the conflict of interest between the principal partners which contribute to the crisis.

The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed in this context, therefore, are not at all what their name suggest. It is not a question of transforming structures in a way that would eventually lead to renewed general growth and market expansion. Instead, SAPs, are merely adaptations to economic circumstances, subject to the short-term logic of crisis management, and especially to the requirement of guaranteed financial returns for excess capital (particularly through debt servicing).

3. The priority given to the demands of managing the crisis created by the uncontested triumph of the rule of private profit are taking us no-nearer to a solution. On the contrary each passing day takes us further away from a solution. The crisis which is now 20 years old, started at the end of the 1960's and the opening of the 1970's (before the first "oil shock") with a progressive decline in the level of productive investment, and the growth of a mass of excess financial capital

which has not ceased to increase ever since. Ignoring the persistence and tenacity of economic stagnation, successive governments continue to use the language of conjunctural "recessions" and "recoveries", when in fact we have a fundamental structural disequilibrium due to the triumph of economic liberalism. The latter, however, is never put in question. The "solution" by contrast, implies a modification of the rules of the game affecting income distribution, consumption, and investment decisions - in other words, an alternative social project to that founded exclusively on profitability criteria. There will be no solution to the crisis unless and until the "anti-systematic" social forces impose constraints on capital which are exterior to and independent of the logic of pure capital.

#### IV

#### Social Disaster as a Consequence of Crisis Management Policies

1. The social catastrophe has hit all regions of the World. In the developed centers it is manifested in permanent unemployment; in the peripheries in the blockage of economic growth and the aggravation of impoverishment and tragic societal regression. At the global level, the priority of crisis management has sacrificed measures which should rationally have been deployed to save the future of the environment at a planetary level. The ideology of the dominant discourse presents all these "sacrifices" as temporary measures required to rebuild efficient structures to re-launch development. In reality the unilateral subordination to the laws of profit fatally traps countries into deflationary spirals with no possibility of exit on their own. The reversal, when it comes, is always the product of an "external shock" in the sense of a shock external to the unilateral logic of capital.

We cannot escape the crisis by following policies of "liberalism without borders". This is a utopia, tenaciously held

throughout the history of capitalism because it expresses in extreme form the hard core ideological vision of a "pure" capitalism reduced to the laws of accumulation guided exclusively by the strict logic of capital.

Total liberalism has never existed and historical moments, which approximate the political condition for its institutions have always been brief. This is because extreme liberalism necessarily produces a political reaction to check, limit or modify political and social relations, thus creating the conditions for a new phase of expansion - or for war. The ideologues of liberalism are viscerally incapable of understanding the fact that expansion has always been associated with the setting of limits to total liberalism, not by chance but from necessity. This is why these ideologues for ever condemn history, states, bourgeoisies, and peoples, who refuse to bow down to the requirements of "economic law" of an imaginary capitalism which exists only in the text books of conventional economics.

Attempts to institute utopian liberal projects have always produced political reactions of rejection. But these reactions rarely take the form of a systematic counter project, coherent and potentially effective in solving the crisis. In the first instance, they are almost always spontaneous, partial, contradictory, and even conflictual. Today, in a global system characterized by profound internationalization, these reactions find legitimation in the renewal of the discourses of nationalism, which passes easily into chauvinism - aggressive in the case of the relatively strong, defensive in the case of the weak.

Nationalist policies are not necessarily inefficient, as claimed by the liberal theoretical discourse. If Asia has, until now, escaped general crisis, and high rates of growth have prevailed in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, with accelerated growth in China and, albeit at lower rates, also in South East Asia and India, how do we explain this "exception" ? The reasons

are undoubtedly many and complex, and vary from one country to another in this region which comprises over half of humanity. All manner of possible explanation have been offered, including some which accord pride of place to cultural factors, real or imaginary. We simply draw attention to the fact that all the countries in question have adopted policies marked by strong economic nationalism. They have not, like the countries of the European Community and the United States, Latin America or Africa, followed, more or less, the policy prescriptions of liberalism. The Asian countries have rather done the opposite, whether we look at Japan - an advanced capitalist country, or Korea in rapid construction, or the market socialism of Deng Xioping's China, or the more integrated third world capitalist countries - South Asia and India. Why were these countries able to choose such policies and to implement them? The reasons are complex and connected with the geo-strategic preoccupations of the United States in the region (exceptional support extended to Japan, Korea, Taiwan and South East Asia in exchange for their participation in the anti-communist crusade, resulting in a tolerance for nationalism not permitted elsewhere), the sheer size of the continental countries of China and India where the expansion of internal markets is always an option in the event of problems of exports (although other large countries such as Brazil and the new Russia appear either unwilling or unable to mobilize their large domestic markets to their advantage), the particularities of social structures (if China did better than India it is surely because Maoism set in motion a gigantic social transformation which formed the base on which later economic growth was instituted), and perhaps also other reasons (historic and cultural?). We also note that none of the countries of the region, with the qualified exception of India, is particularly respectful of democracy. Japan resembles a one party political model more than the pluralist western one, and all the regimes of East and South-East Asia are "authoritarian" as far as one can tell.

Are these nationalistic practices capables of protecting the Asian region indefinitely ? It is difficult to answer this question Japan might be threatened, and perhaps also the medium size countries of East and South East Asia. India is in political crisis which threatens economic stability. China remains a potential exception if that country can prevent the Southern provinces attracted by the "Korea-Taiwan-Hong Kong model" - from endangering national unity. (an alternative policy would be to direct the growth of these provinces towards the development of the interior of the country). But the growing economic inter-penetration within the entire region gives Asia a relative measure of autonomy with respect to the "rest of the world". This constitutes a factor favourable to the continued pursuit of the "Asian Miracle".

But if nationalism in Asia has produced positive results in terms of economic growth (although not in social justice or democratization), this is not the case in other regions of the world hit by the crisis.

In Latin America, Subsaharan Africa and the Arab world developmental nationalism as practiced by populist regimes in the Bandung era is a matter of the past. The retreat has not opened the way to pass beyond these policies. On the contrary, it has resulted in serious regression. We have suggested that we should interpret the "ethnic assault on the nation" (here as in East Europe and the former USSR), and the illusions of religious fundamentalism (principally islamic, but also hindu) as manifestations of this regression. Far from opening the way to the democratization of states and societies, and a renewal of a positive nationalism and regional cooperation, these involutions raise the possibility of a kind of neo-fascism of weak countries. In Europe, we cannot exclude the possibility of a return to nationalism, in reaction to the European liberal project.

Established powers in the United States, in Europe, in the former East and the Soviet Union, in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, are first and foremost preoccupied with



the management of the political crisis, produced by the economic crisis. But the political crisis management is no more effective in bringing about solutions, than is economic crisis management. The political management of this chaos is based on cynical practices of "real-politik" with a short view, the manipulation of nationalisms, culturalisms, racisms and ethnicities leading to fascism. In East Europe, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, these policies consist of throwing oil on the fires, in the hope of gaining a short term advantage by weakening region powers and reducing the chances of a progressive renaissance of the societies in question.

Far from serving the objectives of the dominant discourse which claims that "democratization is on the rise", the economic and political management of the crisis has everywhere reinforced the danger of anti-democratic regression. Liberalism engenders the risk of fascism, as Karl Polanyi showed in his analysis of "the Great Transformation (1944), in which he invited his contemporaries to understand that the victory of anti-fascism and the rejection of utopian liberal policies which characterized the era following the end of the First World War, would create the conditions for a new economic expansion. The lesson, now forgotten, must be recalled with force. We cannot escape the crisis and the risks of regression to fascism without breaking categorically with the logic of neo-liberal globalization. In the countries of the periphery, situated in what P. G. Casanova so well described as "global colonialism", neo-fascism is the more brutal the weaker and more hopelessness are the societies in which it operates. Ethnic cleansing and the carving up of states, terrorist dictatorships in the name of religion, already apparent, are forms taken by local powers unable to resist the submission of their societies to an insertion into the globalized economy which is the source of their tragedies and catastrophes. These practices may perpetuate the appearance of the maintenance of "order" favourable to the exploitation of these peoples by dominant world capital, and for this reason, be supported by external powers.



Do the following reports, dealing with Subsaharan Africa and the Arab world, support the general conclusions we have drawn here ?

2. In subsaharan Africa, societies are deeply undermined by exclusion, pauperization, and the rising tide of unemployment, which are acquiring unbearable proportion. The multiform crisis which is the expression of this economic and social disaster now threatens to destroy the state, without which, in our time - and for a long time - yet to come - no social progress is conceivable.

The explanation of this profound and complex crisis necessarily implies an adequate articulation of different levels of analysis : the dynamics of the world economy and local economies, the social basis of power, and geopolitics.

There is a striking contrast between the two decades following accession to independence, which were marked by the hope of social progress for all, and the last fifteen years characterized by blocked growth and then the regression of the middle class. The shift obviously coincides with the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). However, this should not lead us to forget the structural weaknesses of the previous phase - the decades of triumphant developmentalism.

During that period, despite performances that were sometimes brilliant in terms of economic growth of the GDP, African countries did not take a path that would allow them to establish their development on a solid basis. To do so would have required them to undertake an industrial revolution (an unavoidable process in our era) and acquire a technological capability. In this framework, the pursuit of transformations in agriculture that would allow agricultural production to grow over the long term - doubtless a priority - would have been conceivable, and at the same time would have created the conditions for the gradual eradication of extreme misery in the rural world.

Instead of taking this path, Africa remained bound to the old rules of division of labour. It did not emerge from its functions as producer-exporter of minerals and tropical products of an agriculture whose productivity remained extremely weak, and was generally stagnant.

For fragile economies of this kind, the massive external borrowing that postponed the crisis could only be suicidal. A huge and growing proportion of a stagnant national product and declining export earnings must now be siphoned off to service this debt. Under these conditions, of course, it has become impossible to try and "reduce poverty", "create jobs" and pursue the objective of social integration.

The crisis is now so deep that it affects the vital fibres of the state. Unfortunately, the word dissolution can now be applied to the state in a growing number of countries. Yet nothing can replace the state in the functions of conducting development and ensuring its articulation with the contingencies and demands of globalization. Globalization is not possible or sustainable if the basis units of the world system - the states - lack a minimum degree of autonomy and room to manoeuvre.

The threshold of illegitimacy is crossed when the state no longer has the means even to ensure essential services, communications, or the day-to-day safety of people and goods. And this, unfortunately, is the case in many African countries. Moreover, under these conditions, how can we talk about prospects of democratization ? The word in this case has become meaningless.

In this crisis, the responsibilities of the Western powers, particularly Europe and the EEC, are obvious. After all, hasn't the association between the countries of the EEC and the ACP (countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), through the Lome convention, helped maintain in Africa the illusion of a form of development inserted in a now obsolete world division of labour ? Hasn't "development aid" help maintain foreign

control over the continent's natural resources ? And what of political and even military interventions, so frequent here - are they not partly responsible for the crisis of the state and its delegitimization ?

Of course, these major responsibilities of Western hegemonism should not make us forget the responsibilities accruing from "internal factors". The nature of local dominant social hegemonies is one of these factors ; it explains many aspects of the crisis that are too often attributed, in superficial analyses, either to local history and culture, or to the symptoms of the degeneration of the state - incompetence, corruption - , and so on. Our report emphasizes the logic of the way these hegemonies operate and the way they fit in with the logic of uneven globalization, and focusses on the mechanisms of the "Fourth Worldization" of the continent that is responsible for the social catastrophe. The report invites us to approach, in a critical spirit, a certain number of little or badly documented issues, including pan-Africanism, the cultural dimension of development, and the distortions of the Eurocentric vision of modernity.

3. In the Arab world the models of national construction, whose major characteristics are presented in the report on the social situation of Arab countries, has already reached their limits at the beginning of the 1980's. At that point the models of accumulation set up in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's entered into a crisis affecting both major balances and productive dynamics. With regard to external balance, decreasing exports, the collapse of direct investment balance, decreasing exports, the collapse of direct investment, and increasing levels of debt as a consequence of the rise of interest rates and the dollar created acute problems of external payments. At the same time, in the area of internal balance, decreasing rents led to an unprecedented increase of the budgetary deficit.

These imbalances were all the more significant in that they affected productive dynamics. It will be recalled that the major feature of these dynamics, in spite of their varying contents, is a marked dependence on imports of capital and semi-processed goods, due to the weak development of these industries in the Arab world. Such imports allowed productive dynamics to maintain high levels of growth and productivity. Thus, the decreased importing capacity of these economies because of aggravated external imbalances led to the slackening of productive dynamics.

At the beginning of the 1980's, therefore, there was a rupture of the growth dynamic and a deconstruction of regulating systems following the decrease in direct and indirect rents in the Arab economies. This crisis caused a degradation of investment capacity, a marked increase in unemployment which now began to affect college graduates, a drop in consumption, and a falling-off of production.

The consequences of the economic crisis for Arab countries were twofold. The first consequence was political and involved the impact of economic discontinuity on the project of legitimization of established power. The crisis brought about a marked reduction in the capacity of these powers to carry out social integration. With the rise of new generations born after independence, the justifications of the anti-colonial struggle had become shopworn, and political powers had therefore centred their legitimization project on the capacity of the development dynamic to integrate and promote social groups. In this sense, the rupture of the economic dynamic caused the legitimization project to crumble.

At the same time as it was causing these political effects, the economic crisis in the Arab world also brought about the implementation in the early 1980's, in most Arab countries, of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank.

The balance-sheet of SAPs in the Arab world shows that these reforms failed to renew the dynamic of growth and were restricted in fact to managing the crisis.

Deflation, with its perverse effects in the social and political spheres, appears to characterize the dynamics of economic growth induced by structural adjustment in Arab countries. This vision has prevailed among public authorities who have reestablished internal balance through a drastic reduction of state intervention with regard to social regulation and development. The same logic has guided the reestablishment of external balance through a marked reduction in imports, which has aggravated the depressionist tendencies in Arab economies. For some economies, such as the Egyptian economy, improvement in the external balance has been facilitated by the rescheduling of the external debt.

The SAPs have also failed to launch a new growth dynamic based on the promotion of exports, and thus have not succeeded in preventing Arab countries from becoming more and more marginalized.

Taken as a whole, the reforms related to structural adjustment have had the effect in the social sphere of reducing real wages and accentuating poverty, while unemployment is rapidly growing.

In the last analysis, structural adjustment programs have not enabled Arab countries to construct new economic and social standards to take the place of the standards challenged by the crisis. On the contrary, the programs have accelerated the dissolution of these standards, deepening economic and social regression and opening the way to the disintegration of Arab societies. In economic terms, these economies are increasingly marginalized within the world system. In the social sphere, beyond a simple deterioration of the living conditions of populations, we are witnessing a social ambivalence between two societies: on the one hand, a modern society that is part of formal modes of production and consumption ; on the other, a society of marginality. This marginal society is the seat of a radical political discourse, influenced by fundamentalist Islamic movements, which contests the legitimacy of the modern state.

## V

Beyond today's "adjustment" : catching up or a new stage of polarization ?

The gigantic transformations brought about by the "development decades" have shaped a world system very different from that of the past.

A country's position in the world pyramid is now defined by its capacity to compete in the world market of manufactures. recognizing this truism does not in any way imply sharing the vulgar economist's view that this position is achieved as the result of "rational" measures, said rationality being measured by the standard of the so-called "objective laws of the market". On the contrary, this competitiveness is a complex product of many economic, political, and social factors.

From this point of view we now have distinct "Third" and "Fourth" worlds. The new Third World includes all of the countries that have succeeded, or may yet succeed, in making a place for themselves on the world market as industrial exporters. On the other hand, countries that have not yet undergone an industrial revolution, or whose industry remains so fragile that it now risks being dismantled - and who therefore remain bound to the old division of labour as exporters of primary products - belong to, or are candidates for inclusion in, what is already being called the "Fourth World".

The globalization of the productive system makes it necessary for us to classify countries and regions according to the part played, in their society, by the "active army" and the "reserve army" of labour. The criterion used here to define the frontiers between the active army and the reserve army must be, in conformity with the logic of the world-wide spread of capitalism, i.e. employment in the more or less competitive segments of the productive system on a world scale. If this

criterion is used it can be said that in the centres the great majority of the work force is effectively participating in the active army, because the slow and progressive historical constitution of the central capitalisms in favourable conditions which cannot be reproduced, has led to this situation. In the industrialised peripheries of Latin America, Eastern Asia (communist and capitalist) and the countries of the former Soviet Union and East Europe segments of the productive system are already, or can become competitive in the sense we give this term. The active army exists here and can pursue its progression. But it will never be able - in the visible future however distant that might be - to absorb the stock of the rural and informal economies. For today's competitiveness demands production techniques which make this absorption impossible and the safety valve of massive emigration does not exist. In the non-industrialised and/or non competitive peripheries of Africa and the Arab world, the situation is even more extreme : the active army is almost inexistent, all or almost all the people make up a reserve on a world scale.

The industrialisation of the Third World will not bring an end to polarization, inherent to actually existing world capitalism, but will transfer its mechanisms and forms to other levels, controlled by the financial, technological, cultural and military monopolies from which the centres derive their benefits. Industrialization will not reproduce here a social evolution like that of the developed West. Here fordism arrived after the transformation of society during a long period of preparation by the great mechanical industry, supported by a continuous agricultural revolution operating in a favourable atmosphere thanks to the prospect that emigration towards the Americas offered to the pressures brought on by the European demographic explosion and to the colonial conquests procuring cheap raw materials. So fordism came and reinforced the historical capital/labour compromise, facilitated by the reduction of the reserve armies in the centres. In the Third World in the process of industrialisation, however, none of these favourable conditions



exist to avoid capitalist expansion taking on brutal forms. The coexistence of a rapidly growing active army and an ever abundant reserve army makes for a severe and potentially revolutionary social conflict. This situation, characteristic of modern peripheral capitalism, creates political and ideological conditions favourable to the construction of national and popular alliances articulated around the working class, peasants overexploited by the cost of financing expansion which is imposed upon them and the poor marginalised masses which make up the reserve army.

In the Fourth World excluded from industrialization at this stage, the social system takes on an extreme grotesque appearance, the greatest part of it having been made up by the reserve army which collects together the marginalised poor and the peasant masses excluded from any agricultural revolution. Faced with these popular classes the minorities exercising power are incapable of asserting the slightest historical legitimacy. The weakness of the social struggles carried out on the production and power territory, which results from this marginalisation, transfers the conflicts to the level of cultural manifestations which are always symptoms of crisis and not a real response to its challenge.

In the unequal fight in the global system, the centers use their "five monopolies". These monopolies challenge the totality of social theory. They are :

(i) Technological monopoly : it requires huge expenditures that only a large and wealthy state can envisage. Without the support of the state - something liberal discourse doesn't mention - most importantly for military spending, most of these monopolies would not last.

(ii) Financial control of world-wide financial markets: these monopolies have an unprecedented efficacy thanks to the liberalization of rules governing their establishment. Not so long ago the greater part of a nation's savings could circulate only within the arena - largely national - of the financial



institutions. Today these savings are handled centrally by institutions whose operations are worldwide. We are talking of finance capital, capital's most globalized component. The logic of this globalization of finance could be called into question by a simple political decision to delinking, even if limited to the domain of financial transfers. Moreover I think that the rules governing the free movement of finance capital have broken down. This system had been based on the free floating of currencies on the market (according to the theory that money is a merchandise like any other) with the dollar serving de facto as a universal currency. The money as merchandise theory is unscientific and the position of the dollar is only faute de mieux. A national currency cannot fulfill the functions of an international currency unless there is a surplus of exports in the "international currency" country, thus underwriting structural adjustment in the other countries. This was the case of Great Britain in the late nineteenth century. This is not the case of the United States today which finances its deficit by imposed borrowing. Nor is this the case for the competitors of the United States : Japan's surplus (that of Germany disappeared after reunification) is not sufficient to meet the financial needs occasioned by the structural adjustments of the others. Under these conditions financial globalization, far from being a "natural" process, is an extremely fragile one. In the short run it leads only to permanent instability and not to the stability necessary for the efficient operation of the processes of adjustment.

(iii) Monopolies of access to the planet's natural resources : the dangers of the reckless exploitation of these resources is now planet-wide. Capitalism, based on short-term rationality, cannot overcome these dangers posed by this reckless behavior, and it therefore reinforces the monopolies of already developed countries. Their concern is simply not to let others be equally irresponsible.

(iv) Media and communication monopolies : they not only lead to uniformity of culture but also open up new means

of political manipulation. The expansion of the modern media market is already one of the major components of the erosion of democratic practices in the west itself.

(v) Finally, monopolies of weapons of mass destruction. Held in check by the postwar bipolarity, this monopoly is again the sole domain of the United States, as in 1945. If "proliferation" risks getting out of control it is still the only way of fighting this unacceptable monopoly in the absence of democratic international control.

These five monopolies taken as a whole define the framework within which the law of globalized value operates. The law of value is the condensed expression of all these conditions, hardly the expression of objective "pure" economic rationality. All of these processes, their conditioning, annuls the impact of industrialization in the peripheries, devalues their productive work, and overvalues the supposed value added to the activities of the new monopolies from which the centers profit. What results is a new hierarchy in the distribution of income on a world scale, more unequal than ever before, subordinating the industries of the peripheries, reducing them to subcontracting. This is the new foundation of polarization, presaging its future forms. Current developments suggest different possible scenarios, none of which question the cause of "North-south" polarization. The commanding logic of the capitalist system perpetuates the center/periphery polarization. Its modes of operation are ever renewed and will in the future be founded on the five monopolies around which the argument was constructed.

The globalization processes will continue to generate poverty and social marginalization. One could say that there is nothing new in this view because polarization is almost part of the natural order of things. I do not conclude on this note precisely because this is what has changed over the last five centuries : peoples peripheralized by capitalist world expansion, who seemed for a long time to accept their fate, have

over the past 50 years not been accepting it any longer and will accept it less and less in the future. The positive aspect of the universalization which capitalism inaugurated - and which can't get beyond its present truncated version - is the worm in the fruit. The final explanation for the instability of the "world-system" in progress is found here.

## VI

### For a humanist and social alternative

Neither the persistence of the liberal, nor the logic of neo-fascist rejection offers escape from the infernal circle of crisis and chaos.

An effective response to these challenges is not possible until the lessons of the "Great Transformation" have been learned. History is not shaped by the infallible laws of pure economics, as believed by some university professors. It is the product of social reactions to the effects of these laws, which in turn define the social relations of the framework within which economic laws operate. It is the "anti-systemic" force of an organized, coherent and effective refusal to subordinate society to the unilateral and total needs of economic laws (in this context the laws of profit of the capitalist system) which in reality give shape to history, rather than any "pure" logic of the accumulation of capital. These forces determine the possibilities and the forms of expansion deployed within the institutional framework which they impose on economic and social organization.

The method advocated here does not permit us to formulate ready made "receptes" of how to escape from the crisis. Solutions can only come as a result of transformations of the relations of social and political forces resulting from struggles the outcome of which cannot be known in advance. We can however offer reflections with the perspective of contributing to the crystallization of coherent and feasible counter projects. In

this way we might prevent social movements from becoming side-tracked into the impasse of false (neo-fascist) solutions.

We thus limit ourself to some basic propositions concerning such reflections.

Although the world cannot be managed as a single "world market", and ideological and political intervention cannot be eliminated in favour of unilateral submission to the supposed laws of the market (as believed by anti-statist ideologues tous azimuts) the fact of globalization cannot simply be ignored or denied. It is not possible to turn the clock back on the course of history. A return to the post war model of economic expansion, implies economic and other untenable regressions. This is why backward looking ideologies which deny the irreversible nature of the trajectory of evolution will inevitably be called upon to function like fascisms, that is to say they will serve the needs of the new conditions of globalization, while pretending to offer escape and liberation. They are based on deception and lies and this is why they cannot function without authoritarian negation of democracy. They are constrained to mobilize societies on the basis of false problems - ethnic purity, submission to supposed laws of religion - and to use these false causes as instruments to impose their dictatorships by terror.

The challenge thus consists of reconciling the interdependence implied by globalization and the inequalities of power of the "social partners" (workers in different sectors of the economy, some more "competitive" than others) and the "national partners" (dominant centers, middle powers, industrialized peripheries, the marginalized fourth world) in relation to global capital. Let us start with some self evident banalities : the world is both unified and diverse. But diversity is not exclusively - or even principally cultural. Emphasis on cultural diversity relegates the major diversities of position in the economic hierarchy of world capitalism, to secondary importance. But it is at the level of the latter that we must begin the attack on

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the problem. These are manifested not only in inequalities between peoples (culturally different or not, according to circumstance) but also to internal inequalities between classes and social groups. There are no solutions to the crisis except by the reinforcement of the position of the poor and the dominated social classes of all countries of centers and peripheries. In other words, escape from "global colonialism" and liberal myths implies the rejection of temptations to fall back on neo-fascist illusions. these are the principles which form the point of departure for meaningful reflection on the construction of a counter project which is humanist, universalist, democratic, and respectful of diversities - but not inequalities.

Implied in the realization of such a project is the construction of a global political system which is not in the service of a global market but which defines its parameters, just as the nation-state historically represented the social framework of the national market and not its field of deployment. A global political system would thus have major responsibilities in each of the following four domains :

(i) The organization of global disarmament at appropriate levels, liberating humanity from the menace of nuclear and other holocausts.

(ii) The organization of access to the planet's resources in an equitable manner so that there would be less and less inequality. There should be a global decision-making process with a valuation (tarification) of resources which would make obligatory waste reduction and the distribution of the value and income from these resources. This would also be the beginning of a globalized fiscal system.

(iii) Negotiation of open, flexible economic relationships between the world's major regions which are unequally developed. This would reduce progressively the centers' technological and financial monopolies. This means of course the

liquidation of the institutions presently running the global market (the so-called World Bank, the IMF, GATT, etc...) and the creation of other systems for managing the global economy.

(iv) Starting negotiation for the correct management of the global/national dialectic in the areas of communication, culture, and political policy. This implies the creation of political institutions which would represent social interests operating on a global scale, the beginning of a "world parliament" going beyond interstate mechanisms that exist now.

It is more than evident that current trends are not going in the direction described above and that the humanist objectives are not those being fought about today. The erosion of the old system of globalization is not able to prepare its own succession and can lead only to chaos. Dominant forces are developing their activities in the framework of these constraints, trying to manoeuvre for short-term gain and thereby aggravating the chaos. Their attempt to legitimate their choices by the state ideology of the "self-regulating" market, by affirming that "there is no alternative", or by pure and simple cynicism, is not the solution but is part of the problem. The people's spontaneous responses to the degradation are not necessarily more helpful. In a time of disarray illusory solutions, such as fundamentalism or chauvinism, can be very politically mobilizing. It is up to us to formulate, in theory and in practice, a humanistic response to the challenge. In its absence and until it is formulated, regressive and criminal scenarios will be the most likely order of the day.

We need a "polycentric world" as a framework within which negotiated interdependence can be organized in a way which offers dominated peoples and classes improvement in the conditions of their participation in production, and access to better conditions of life. This project implies that we pass beyond action at the level of the nation state to benefit from political and economic organization at the regional level, with collective negotiation between regions.

The concepts of globalization and regionalization proposed here do not blur national reality and its requirements, especially in the Third World, where national construction is far from complete. In fact, if desirable regional solidarities and an adequate, pluricentric world system are to work effectively, the units that make up must themselves have acquired genuine substance. History - by which we mean the exhaustion of the national project of the "Bandung" era - shows that this national construction, an unavoidable prerequisite, can only acquire such substance if it is conceived as an authentic popular responsibility, one far more demanding than the elitist concept of the nation and/or the nationalist populism of past decades. We are here concerned with a new conception of regionalization, different from that conceived in the present framework of power relations. The latter are constructed like transmission belts of polarizing modernization whereby peripheral zones are attached to dominant centers which share responsibilities of a "global colonialism". NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area attaching Mexico to the United States and Canada), the Lome Agreements (Association of the European Union with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), a yen zone (Japan and South East Asia), and the proposed "Pacific Zone" (United States, Japan, Australia and the Pacific rim countries), are neo-imperialist concepts inadequate for the purposes of addressing the desired objective of reducing the development gap. Regional "common markets" (like Mercosur in Latin America, ECOWAS in West Africa, and the PTA in East and Southern Africa) and political organization inherited from the cold war (ASEAN in South East Asia), have likewise been the object of serious critiques, elaborated elsewhere.

In contrast to these inadequate visions of regionalization, we argue in favour of a reconstruction carried out simultaneous at the regional and the global level, particularly in the area of capital markets and monetary systems. Here we shall limit ourselves to a summary of some of the conclusions of studies developed elsewhere :



(i) It will be necessary to conceive the new World Trade Organization, not as a successor of the GATT, but as an institution charged with planning (dare I use the term ?) access to the use of the major natural resources of the globe and the prices of raw materials, without which the environmental discourse remains demagogic rhetoric, manipulated against the interests of humanity in general, and the peoples of the periphery in particular. The World Trade Organization should also take responsibility for planning targets for inter-regional trade in industrial products, reconciling general competitiveness, with distributional criteria favouring the disadvantaged regions, and the creation of conditions which permit the improvement of incomes of disadvantaged workers.

(ii) It is necessary to put in place mechanisms of organized capital markets to channel excess finance toward productive investment in the peripheries, taking into account that the global market favours financial transfers from the poorest to the rich countries, and channels excess savings to the United States, enabling the United States to perpetuate its external payments deficits.

(iii) It is necessary to rethink the international monetary system, which has become non functional, and to replace floating exchange rates and the dollar standard with a system which articulates regional moneys of each of the large regions of the third world, and that of the ex USSR in a way which guarantees relative stability of exchange rates and reinforces the functioning of capital markets as suggested above. We propose this as an alternative to the transformation of the IMF into a world central bank, on the grounds that this is utopian and dangerous, given the polarizing tendencies of global capital markets.

The functions and purposes of the regions which are suggested are not limited to spaces of preferential economic integration. They should equally serve as political spaces



favouring the collective re-inforcement of the social position of disadvantaged classes and sub-regions. This regionalization is not intended to be confined to the continents of the third world (Latin America, the Arab world, subsahara Africa, South-East Asia and the two continental countries, India and China) but also to serve the European spaces (European Union, East Europe,, the former USSR).

The perspective of such a compromise between globalization and local and regional autonomy (which we have called a "coherent delinking" in response to the new challenges) would call for a serious revision of the concept of "development assistance", and the democratization of the United Nations System, which could then be employed to implement the objectives of disarmament (facilitated by measures of regional and national security within the framework of regional reconstruction). The United Nations would be able to put in place a system of world taxation (closely related to the management of the world's natural resources), and complement the United Nations as a system of inter-state relations with a "world parliament" able to reconcile the requirements of universalim (individual rights, collective rights of peoples, political and social rights, etc...) with the diversity of our historic and cultural heritage.

It is well understood that the totality of this "project" has no chance of realization, unless social forces able to carry out the necessary reforms first cristalize at the level of the nation-State, because there is no possibility of reform within the structures imposed by global liberalization and polarization. Reform at the sectoral level (reorganization of administration, taxation, education, support for participatory development, etc...) and a more general vision of the democratization of societies and their political and economic management are preliminary steps and stages which cannot be short-circuited or circumvented. Without them the vision of a reorganized planetary order able to save the world from chaos and crisis and "re-launch development" remains fatally and perfectly utopian.

### By way of conclusion

In record time, pursuit of the liberal utopia has produced results so catastrophic that its discourse is already losing ground, even though some institutions believe they can answer the challenge by running even faster in the same direction - a tendency as crazy as it is dismaying. (The World Bank's latest report on development provides an illustration of this). The wind has begun to shift in favour of reason. The possibility of this evolution is announced by the actions of the United Nations (requiring annual reports on human development from the UNDP, organizing this Summit, and calling, through its Secretary General, for a debate on a revival of development), and the actions of Third World countries who refused to endorse the proposals of the G7 at the General Assembly of the IMF and the World Bank (Madrid, October 1994).

It will be necessary to go further and faster. Let us remember the positive functions carried out in the past by United Nations institutions - UNDP, UNCTAD, regional commissions - in forcing OECD countries to engage in a dialogue with the Third World, which at the time was represented by organizations such as the Group of 77 and the non-aligned movement. The crisis has temporarily put an end to these dialogues, thus flattering the arrogance of great powers (the G7) and institutions exclusively devoted to their service (the Bretton Woods institutions). We must establish a better balance and give the United Nations its rightful place again. Let us hope that the Social Summit will shoulder its responsibilities in this respect, and through its recommendations will support the efforts required to set development in motion again.

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